Stephens v. Multnomah County Ex Rel. Judicial Department, 678 F. App'x 517

Pro se plaintiffs Karellen and Renee Stephens appealed dismissal of claims arising from burns their daughter allegedly suffered, asserting violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), 1986, various constitutional amendments, and Oregon IIED law.
The district court dismissed claims against Multnomah County, several attorneys and judges as barred by res judicata because the same claims were or could have been raised in an earlier action.
The court dismissed the remaining § 1983 claims for failure to allege deprivation of any constitutional right (First Amendment retaliation, Seventh, Thirteenth, equal protection, due process were all rejected for lack of factual support).
Claims under §§ 1985(3) and 1986 were dismissed because plaintiffs offered only conclusory conspiracy allegations insufficient to state a claim.
The IIED claim under Oregon law was dismissed for failure to allege intent to cause severe emotional distress or conduct exceeding socially tolerable bounds.
The district court’s entry of a narrowly tailored pre-filing review order was upheld; plaintiffs’ judicial-bias argument lacked support.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Res judicata for certain defendants	Stephens argued claims were not barred and could proceed	Defendants argued identical claims were raised or could have been raised earlier	Affirmed: res judicata bars those claims
Sufficiency of § 1983 claims	Stephens claimed constitutional deprivations (First, Seventh, Thirteenth, Fourteenth)	Defendants argued no facts showed deprivation of any constitutional right	Affirmed: § 1983 claims fail for lack of factual allegations
§§ 1985(3) and 1986 conspiracy claims	Stephens alleged a conspiracy to harm them	Defendants argued allegations were conclusory and legally insufficient	Affirmed: conspiracy claims dismissed for conclusory pleading
IIED under Oregon law	Stephens alleged severe emotional distress from defendants’ conduct	Defendants argued no intent or extreme conduct alleged	Affirmed: IIED dismissed for failure to plead intent or outrageous conduct
Pre-filing restriction & bias	Stephens contended the pre-filing order and proceedings were improper/bias occurred	Defendants argued court followed procedure, made findings, and tailored order	Affirmed: pre-filing order appropriate; no evidentiary support for bias

Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953 (9th Cir.) (res judicata bars claims raised or that could have been raised in prior action)
Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir.) (standards for failure-to-state § 1983 dismissal)
Dietrich v. John Ascuaga’s Nugget, 548 F.3d 892 (9th Cir.) (requirements for First Amendment retaliation claim)
City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (U.S.) (Thirteenth Amendment claim standards)
Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir.) (equal protection pleading requirement)
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (U.S.) (due process claim elements)
Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir.) (requirements for § 1985 claims)
Pareto v. F.D.I.C., 139 F.3d 696 (9th Cir.) (conclusory allegations insufficient to survive dismissal)
Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621 (9th Cir.) (§ 1986 claim depends on valid § 1985 claim)
McGanty v. Staudenraus, 901 P.2d 841 (Or. 1995) (elements of IIED under Oregon law)
Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir.) (standards for imposing pre-filing restrictions)
Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (U.S.) (Seventh Amendment right to jury does not apply in state court)