485 S.W.3d 914
Tex.2016Background
- Vencie and Melba Beard, spouses, executed nearly identical wills disposing of their separate property and all community property; each will included a "common disaster" clause and an alternative phrase "or under circumstances making it impossible to determine [who] died first."
- Melba died at 8:59 p.m. and Vencie at 10:55 p.m. on the same night (homicide-suicide). The order of death was known.
- Elaine Stephens, independent executrix of both estates, sued for a declaration that the Beards did not die in a "common disaster"; trial court and court of appeals found they did and that the Simultaneous Death Act (SDA) was incorporated into the wills.
- The court of appeals adopted a broad definition of "common disaster" as deaths arising from the same set of circumstances, omitting the traditional requirement that the order of death be indeterminable.
- The Texas Supreme Court reviewed whether "common disaster" should be given its settled legal meaning (requiring impossibility of determining order of death) and whether the SDA was incorporated into the wills.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Stephens) | Defendant's Argument (Beard estates / court of appeals) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Beards died in a "common disaster" | Phrase requires impossibility of determining order; here order was known, so no common disaster | "Common disaster" covers deaths arising from the same circumstances (homicide-suicide episode), so clause applies | The Court held there was no "common disaster"; settled meaning requires inability to determine order of death |
| Proper construction of "common disaster" phrase in the wills | Use the established legal meaning (deaths at nearly same time with no way to determine order) | Broader dictionary-based meaning: any deaths from same set of circumstances | The Court held the phrase must be given its settled legal meaning absent contrary intent |
| Effect of the wills' additional language "or under circumstances making it impossible to determine [who] died first" | That phrase clarifies and extends coverage to non-common events where order is indeterminable | The court of appeals treated the two clauses as redundant/broader, collapsing the legal meaning | The Court read the addition as ensuring coverage when order is indeterminable even absent a common event; it did not broaden "common disaster" |
| Whether the wills incorporated the Simultaneous Death Act (SDA) | The wills' explicit common-disaster and survival-period provisions supplant SDA default rules | Court of appeals found SDA incorporated | The Court agreed with Stephens that the wills superseded the SDA and did not incorporate it |
Key Cases Cited
- Perfect Union Lodge No. 10 v. Interfirst Bank of San Antonio, N.A., 748 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. 1988) (will construction focuses on testator's intent and the instrument's four corners)
- San Antonio Area Found. v. Lang, 35 S.W.3d 636 (Tex. 2000) (court must give effect to the words the testator actually used)
- White v. Taylor, 286 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1956) (words in wills are construed in their plain and usual sense absent contrary intent)
- Glover v. Davis, 366 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. 1963) (recognition that no presumption of survivorship exists when persons perish in the same disaster)
- Mitchell v. Mitchell, 244 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. 1951) (established legal usage of language in a will is presumed unless context shows contrary intent)
- Shriner's Hosp. for Crippled Children of Tex. v. Stahl, 610 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. 1980) (courts must focus on the meaning of the words actually used by the testator)