Stephen Wayne Shreve v. State of Tennessee, E2016-01743-CCA-R3-PC

Stephen Wayne Shreve pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated burglary, one count of attempted aggravated burglary, and two counts of theft on January 20, 2015, receiving concurrent ten-year sentences and credit for "time served," then was released to community corrections.
A later community corrections violation (failure to report; new warrants) led to revocation and an order that he serve the remainder of his sentence in prison.
In post-conviction proceedings, Shreve argued his sentences were illegal because he received pretrial jail credit for time he claimed was actually time serving a parole-violation sentence, citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-123(a).
The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing but neither side presented witnesses; Shreve made unsworn statements and counsel failed to introduce records showing the timing or nature of the prior parole sentence or incarceration.
The trial judgments did not reflect credit or identify the prior sentence; absent proof, the new sentences are presumed consecutive to any prior sentence under Rule 32(c)(3).
The post-conviction court denied relief; the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, concluding the record did not show an illegal sentence or involuntary/unknowing pleas.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the sentence was illegal because Shreve received pretrial credit for time allegedly serving a parole-violation sentence (creating effectively concurrent sentences)	Shreve: Pretrial/jail credit was improperly applied to these convictions while he was serving time for a parole violation, rendering the sentence void/illegal under § 40-28-123(a).	State: Shreve failed to make a colorable claim or produce proof; judgments are silent and presumed consecutive; claim not established.	Held: No illegal sentence shown on the record; petitioner failed to prove entitlement to relief.
Whether Shreve’s guilty pleas were involuntary/unknowing due to alleged misunderstanding about pretrial credit	Shreve: He would not have pleaded guilty if he’d known he could not receive credit for the time he served after the parole violation.	State: Claim waived/unsupported; no evidence or sworn testimony; plea colloquy and record do not show involuntariness.	Held: Pleas were not shown to be involuntary or unknowing; post-conviction court properly denied relief.

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (U.S. 1970) (standard for voluntary and intelligent guilty plea)
Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. 1993) (factors for assessing voluntariness of plea)
Moody v. State, 160 S.W.3d 512 (Tenn. 2005) (procedures for challenging illegal sentence; habeas or Rule 36.1)
Hogan v. Mills, 168 S.W.3d 753 (Tenn. 2005) (new sentence presumed consecutive when judgment silent)
Grindstaff v. State, 297 S.W.3d 208 (Tenn. 2009) (clear-and-convincing standard for post-conviction proof)
Howell v. State, 151 S.W.3d 450 (Tenn. 2004) (post-conviction relief framework)
Frazier v. State, 303 S.W.3d 674 (Tenn. 2010) (appellate review of post-conviction factual findings)
Turner v. State, 919 S.W.2d 346 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (totality of circumstances test for plea voluntariness)
Chamberlain v. State, 815 S.W.2d 534 (Tenn. Crim. App.) (considerations in determining voluntariness of plea)
Hicks v. State, 983 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. Crim. App.) (definition of clear and convincing evidence)