Stephen Shoemaker v. Robert Taylor
730 F.3d 778
9th Cir.2013Background
- Shoemaker was convicted in California court of eight misdemeanor counts of possession of child pornography under § 311.11(a) and one misdemeanor count of duplicating under § 311.3; sentenced to custody, probation, fines, and life sex-offender registration.
- Evidence consisted of eight images seized from Shoemaker's Beachbaby and Blowout servers, with six images on Beachbaby and two in a Beachbaby subdirectory later copied to Blowout.
- Exhibits 3,5,7,9,12,13 were nude children; Exhibits 8 and 14 were claimed morphed images of children engaging in sexual activity.
- Trial court instructed with Dost factors to assess lewdness/lasciviousness and allowed consideration of context and website placement in evaluating whether images are child pornography.
- Prosecutor argued that placement of images on Beachbaby (an adult site) turned innocuous images into child pornography; defense raised First Amendment concerns.
- On federal habeas review under AEDPA, district court denial followed; the Ninth Circuit affirmed, addressing First Amendment and due-process challenges with deference to state court rulings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are Exhibits 3, 5, 7, 9, 12, 13 child pornography under Dost factors? | Shoemaker contends these nude images are innocuous and protected speech. | Taylor argues images meet lewd/lascivious criteria per Dost and Ferber. | Images are child pornography; not protected speech. |
| Are Exhibits 8 and 14 morphed images protected by the First Amendment? | Shoemaker argues morphs should be protected; no clear Supreme Court rule against morphed images. | Taylor asserts morphed images implicate real minors and fall outside First Amendment protection. | Under § 2254(d), state court reasonably rejected protection; morphed images fall outside protected speech. |
| May the context in which images were displayed be considered to determine child pornography? | Shoemaker says context cannot drive the determination; Free Speech Coalition controls. | Taylor argues some context may be relevant; the state court applied Free Speech Coalition sufficiently. | Context cannot be the sole basis, but the state court’s instruction was not unreasonable; prosecutorial error acknowledged. |
| Was the prosecutorial error harmless, given the context and evidence? | Prosecutor’s emphasis on Beachbaby context violated Free Speech Coalition. | Error was harmless given multiple Dost factors supported each image. | Harmless error under Brecht/Fry; no substantial impact on verdict. |
| Was the evidence sufficient to support the convictions on possession and duplication? | Sufficiency challenged as to linkage between images and defendant's control. | Evidence linking Beachbaby/ Blowout servers and folders to Shoemaker was strong. | Evidence sufficient to sustain both possession and duplication convictions. |
Key Cases Cited
- New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (upholds criminalization of lewd exhibitions involving minors)
- Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (not every nude photo of a child is obscene; lewdness exceptions exist)
- United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal. 1986) (six-factor test for lewdness/lasciviousness used to assess child pornography)
- Hill, 459 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2006) (Dost factors applied in evaluating depictions of nude children)
- Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (context cannot be sole determinant; prohibits turning on presentation; allows some contextual analysis)
- Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984) (establishes narrow limits on unprotected speech categories; independent review advised)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (reasonable-doubt standard for sufficiency of evidence)
- Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (harmless-error standard in collateral review)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (AEDPA deference; clearly established federal law)
- United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirmation of Dost test in the Ninth Circuit)
