Stephen L. Key v. Brown University, 163 A.3d 1162

Brown University renovated the Wendell R. Erickson Athletic Complex, building an artificial-turf field hockey field adjacent to plaintiffs’ historic home, with bleachers, press box, scoreboard, and PA system.
Plaintiffs Stephen Key (trustee and homeowner) and Melanie Mitchell live next to the new field and allege physical damage, diminution in property value, and loss of use and enjoyment.
Brown submitted an Institutional Master Plan (IMP) to the Providence City Plan Commission (CPC) in 2011; plaintiffs did not attend CPC hearings nor appeal the CPC approval within the statutory period.
Brown held later community forums and delivered neighborhood notices in 2012; plaintiffs received notice but did not attend and later learned of omitted features (scoreboard, PA system, correct field location).
Plaintiffs sought administrative enforcement and sent demand letters to the city’s Department of Inspections and Standards (DIS); the city declined to act and plaintiffs filed administrative appeals they characterized as appeals from nonresponses.
In Superior Court plaintiffs sued Brown and the City seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment that the IMP was deficient and the field’s use unlawful. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to defendants on Count 1, holding plaintiffs lacked standing. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing to seek declaratory relief under the UDJA	Key and Mitchell allege particularized, concrete injuries (property damage, loss of value, diminished enjoyment) as abutters, so they have standing	Only the city (via solicitor) may initiate enforcement actions; plaintiffs lack standing and failed to exhaust administrative remedies	Plaintiffs have standing: their alleged economic and property injuries are concrete and particularized and suffice for UDJA declaratory relief
Requirement to exhaust administrative remedies	Plaintiffs argue administrative avenues are exhausted or unavailable and that declaratory relief is permissible regardless	Defendants argue plaintiffs failed to pursue or exhaust statutory administrative remedies and thus lack a basis for judicial relief	Failure to pursue or exhaust administrative remedies does not bar a UDJA declaratory action here; plaintiffs seek a declaration, not direct compulsion of city enforcement
Scope of appropriate declaratory relief	Plaintiffs seek declaration that IMP was deficient and field use is unlawful to support nuisance and negligence claims	Defendants argue declaratory relief cannot be used to force municipal enforcement or usurp the solicitor’s enforcement authority	Court: Superior Court may declare legal rights and duties under UDJA (it cannot compel the city to prosecute), and such a declaration can support private causes of action; remand for further proceedings

N & M Properties, LLC v. Town of West Warwick, 964 A.2d 1141 (R.I. 2009) (UDJA requires an actual case or controversy and standing).
Bowen v. Mollis, 945 A.2d 314 (R.I. 2008) (focus on whether claimant has standing to seek adjudication).
Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 699 A.2d 856 (R.I. 1997) (definition of injury in fact).
Rhode Island Ophthalmological Society v. Cannon, 317 A.2d 124 (R.I. 1974) (standing satisfied where challenged action caused injury in fact).
Town of Coventry v. Hickory Ridge Campground, Inc., 306 A.2d 824 (R.I. 1973) (legislative intent limiting private enforcement to avoid harassment; municipal solicitor’s enforcement role).
P.J.C. Realty, Inc. v. Barry, 811 A.2d 1202 (R.I. 2002) (Superior Court may declare duties of a municipality under zoning law even if it cannot issue mandamus).
Taylor v. Marshall, 376 A.2d 712 (R.I. 1977) (UDJA permits declaratory relief even if administrative remedies exist).
Watson v. Fox, 44 A.3d 130 (R.I. 2012) (standing inquiry focuses on the claimant).
McKenna v. Williams, 874 A.2d 217 (R.I. 2005) (clarifies standing requires claimant be proper party to request adjudication).