Stephanie Smith v. Commonwealth of Ky., 36 F.4th 671

Plaintiffs allege that Kentucky probation officer Ronald Tyler raped and sexually assaulted them between 2017–2019 while they were incarcerated or under supervision; Tyler also allegedly threatened retaliation.
A 2018 sexual harassment complaint against Tyler was concealed by his supervisor, Johnathan Hall; Hall was later terminated and Tyler was criminally charged by the state.
Plaintiffs claim continuing emotional injuries and that one plaintiff’s death resulted from a relapse caused by those injuries.
In May 2021 Plaintiffs sued the Commonwealth of Kentucky and Governor Beshear, initially invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Thirteenth Amendment, then amending to rely exclusively on the Thirteenth Amendment.
The district court dismissed, holding the Thirteenth Amendment does not create a private damages cause of action nor abrogate state sovereign immunity; Plaintiffs timely appealed.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding Plaintiffs had an available § 1983 remedy (but missed the limitations period) and that the Thirteenth Amendment does not unequivocally abrogate state sovereign immunity.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether §1 of the Thirteenth Amendment creates an implied private cause of action for damages against a State	Thirteenth Amendment is self‑executing and therefore implies a private right to sue a State for involuntary servitude and related sexual abuses	No implied constitutional cause of action is available where Congress has provided an adequate statutory remedy (e.g., §1983 and statutes enacted under §2 of the XIII Am.)	No implied private damages action; plaintiffs should have pursued §1983 or statutory remedies but failed to do so timely
Whether the Thirteenth Amendment abrogates state sovereign immunity	Ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment by the States constitutes consent to suit under the Amendment	Abrogation requires Congress to unequivocally express intent to abrogate sovereign immunity; the Amendment’s text does not do so	The Thirteenth Amendment does not unequivocally abrogate state sovereign immunity; Kentucky’s immunity bars the suit
Whether plaintiffs may evade §1983 limitations by suing directly under the Constitution	Plaintiffs sought to avoid the expired §1983 limitations period by suing directly under the Thirteenth Amendment	Where §1983 was available, courts will not imply a separate constitutional damages remedy to avoid statute of limitations constraints	Plaintiffs cannot circumvent §1983 limitations by asserting a direct constitutional claim; their §1983 remedy was the proper avenue

The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (discussing enforcement clauses and self‑executing character of Reconstruction amendments)
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognized implied damages remedy against federal officers for Fourth Amendment violations)
Thomas v. Shipka, 818 F.2d 496 (6th Cir. 1987) (declining to imply constitutional cause of action where statutory remedy exists)
Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989) (§1983 provides exclusive federal remedy for certain constitutional violations by state actors)
Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989) (borrow state statute of limitations for §1983 claims)
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Congress must unequivocally express intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity)
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (Congress can abrogate state immunity under Fourteenth Amendment if intent is clear)
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (Eleventh Amendment principles extend to suits by a State’s own citizens)
Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (exception allowing suits for prospective relief against state officers)
Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (2011) (limitations on Congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity)