Stephanie Miller v. City of Monona
784 F.3d 1113
7th Cir.2015Background
- Stephanie Miller (substituted by her estate) sought city approval to build condominiums in Monona, WI; project encountered prolonged review and enforcement actions from 2004–2010.
- Miller purchased an adjacent stalled lot, revised plans (from 4 to 10 units), and asbestos was discovered on her lots, requiring multi-stage abatement and demolition.
- City officials and an independent inspector (Nettum) issued multiple citations, stop-work orders (DNR involvement), and demanded remediation measures (e.g., fencing); some enforcement steps overlapped or were reversed.
- Miller’s municipal-court trial rejected three of four citations but upheld one citation for demolition without proper permit; she paid forfeitures.
- Miller sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting a class-of-one equal protection claim (alleging disparate treatment vis‑à‑vis a larger Metcalfe development), sex discrimination, and a Fourth Amendment unlawful entry claim; only the class-of-one claim is at issue on appeal.
- The district court dismissed the class-of-one claim for failure to identify a suitable comparator; the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding Miller’s complaint revealed conceivable rational bases (asbestos, code violations, delayed compliance) that defeat a class-of-one claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Miller stated a class-of-one equal protection claim | Miller: City treated her uniquely without rational basis; Metcalfe development is a suitable comparator | City: Metcalfe differs materially (no asbestos/code problems); Miller’s property justified enforcement — thus rational basis exists | Affirmed dismissal: Miller’s complaint shows rational bases (asbestos, code violations, delayed compliance) that defeat class-of-one claim |
| Whether Metcalfe project is a valid comparator | Miller: Metcalfe developed nearby without scrutiny or fees, showing disparate treatment | City: Metcalfe was larger and had no asbestos/code issues, so not similarly situated | Court: Size difference not dispositive, but asbestos/code issues make Metcalfe an unsuitable comparator |
| Whether class-of-one claim is unripe or a disguised takings claim requiring Williamson exhaustion | Miller: Alleged bona fide equal protection claim (malicious targeting) — exception to Williamson | City: Argues claim may be a takings claim and thus unripe under Williamson County | Court: Declined to treat as jurisdictional ripeness issue because resolving Williamson requires addressing merits; proceeded to merits and rejected claim |
| Whether allegations of third‑party animus (Lichtfeld) can save the claim | Miller: Lichtfeld (former mayor) influenced officials to target her; discovery could show he controlled officials | City: Lichtfeld was not decisionmaker; officials investigated independently; even if animus present, rational bases remain | Court: Even imputing possible third‑party animus, plaintiff must negate conceivable rational bases; complaint shows independent, rational reasons for officials’ conduct — claim fails |
Key Cases Cited
- Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591 (2008) (discretionary governmental decisions are generally not subject to class‑of‑one equal protection claims)
- Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (recognition of class‑of‑one equal protection theory)
- CEnergy‑Glenmore Wind Farm #1, LLC v. Town of Glenmore, 769 F.3d 485 (7th Cir. 2014) (federal courts should defer to local land‑use decisions)
- Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2012) (reversed dismissal where an extraordinary pattern of baseless police tickets supported a class‑of‑one claim)
- Swanson v. City of Chetek, 719 F.3d 780 (7th Cir. 2013) (reversed summary judgment where mayor’s prolonged harassment supported class‑of‑one theory)
- Del Marcelle v. Brown County Corp., 680 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2012) (discussing the standard and circuit tensions for class‑of‑one claims)
- Fares Pawn, LLC v. Indiana Department of Financial Institutions, 755 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 2014) (plaintiff must exclude any reasonably conceivable rational basis for disparate treatment)
- D.B. ex rel. Kurtis B. v. Kopp, 725 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2013) (pleading that reveals a conceivable rational basis defeats a class‑of‑one claim)