Stephanie Marshall v. Richard Diamond
679 F. App'x 554
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Stephanie Marshall claims ownership of a 1973 Ferrari and movie royalty rights (The Exorcist) transferred from her father, John Marshall.
- A creditor of John Marshall obtained a Los Angeles Superior Court order seizing the Ferrari and, by stipulation, assigning the Exorcist royalties to the bankruptcy trustee for John Marshall’s estate.
- The bankruptcy court held an auction for the Ferrari, the royalties, and various creditor claims against the Marshalls.
- At the auction, bidder Patrick Pittelli attempted to bid using pooled funds that included money from the Marshalls; the bankruptcy court disallowed bids that included Marshalls’ funds and set aside Pittelli’s bid.
- The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) dismissed Stephanie Marshall’s appeal for lack of Article III standing; Marshall appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Marshall has Article III standing to appeal the bankruptcy court's order excluding Pittelli's bid | Marshall contends the exclusion of Pittelli's bid injured her interests in the Ferrari and royalties because it affected the auction outcome | The government/trustee argues Marshall's alleged injury is not fairly traceable to the bankruptcy court order and is speculative | No—Marshall lacks standing; appeal affirmed |
| Whether the bankruptcy court order caused a concrete, redressable injury to Marshall | Marshall argues the order impaired her interests by affecting disposition of seized assets | Respondents argue seizure and transfer resulted from the state court order and stipulation, not the auction ruling | No—the exclusion did not itself seize the assets and thus did not cause Marshall’s asserted injury |
| Whether speculative chain of events can satisfy redressability (e.g., Pittelli wins auction then state action would be dismissed) | Marshall claims a favorable ruling could prevent downstream dismissal and restore her interests | Respondents contend the chain depends on independent actors and speculative outcomes, so it is not redressable | No—speculation about independent actors cannot establish redressability |
| Whether Marshall can vindicate third-party (Pittelli’s) rights by suing on his behalf | Marshall seeks relief for the injury she says Pittelli suffered by exclusion | Respondents assert Marshall cannot assert another party’s legal rights absent a showing Pittelli cannot bring his own appeal | No—plaintiff cannot rest claim on third-party rights without justification |
Key Cases Cited
- Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010) (standing reviewed de novo)
- In re Palmdale Hills Prop., LLC, 654 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2011) (Art. III standing elements)
- Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (U.S. 2000) (standing doctrine and injury requirements)
- Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (U.S. 2013) (speculation about independent actors cannot establish standing)
- Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (U.S. 1975) (plaintiff must assert own legal rights, not third parties’)
- Wasson v. Sonoma Cty. Junior Coll., 203 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff cannot rest claim on third-party rights)