Stephanie Harris v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
49A02-1608-CR-1797
| Ind. Ct. App. | Apr 26, 2017Background
- On May–July 2015 police responded to a Marion County house where Stephanie Harris was living; homeowner Floreatha McKoy (through daughter Jeannette Shaw) disputed Harris’s possession. Harris produced a lease and a $5,000 receipt but no contact for the lessor. Officers concluded Harris lacked contractual interest and ultimately referred the case for prosecution.
- Harris was charged with Level 5 burglary, Level 6 theft, and Level 6 forgery; jury convicted on burglary and theft, and the theft conviction was merged into the burglary sentence (five years with two executed).
- At trial Sergeant Walters (a detective) testified about the two common “home takeover” schemes and the unit’s investigatory procedures; Officer Williams‑Ervin testified about his interactions with Harris and his view that she was squatting rather than a fraud victim.
- Harris objected at trial to some testimony (motion in limine granted for certain opinions), but many objections were not renewed during trial; she raised relevance/prejudice, impermissible opinion/legal-conclusion testimony, and course-of-investigation concerns on appeal.
- The State presented the home-takeover testimony to explain the scheme type relevant to the case and to rebut the defense theory that Harris herself was a fraud victim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Harris) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Sgt. Walters’ testimony on "home takeover" schemes and procedures | Testimony is relevant background on a prevalent, complex scheme and helps the jury understand investigative procedures | Testimony was irrelevant, prejudicial, and improper course-of-investigation/hearsay evidence | Admission was not an abuse of discretion; testimony was relevant background and not unduly prejudicial |
| Admission of officer opinions/legal conclusions (704(b) and motion in limine) | Testimony rebutted defense suggestion that Harris was a victim; some statements described officer actions/observations, not legal conclusions | Officers gave opinions on Harris’s guilt, legal conclusions that she lacked contractual interest, violating Rule 704(b) | Errors waived by failure to object at trial; where elicited by defense (invited) or responsive to cross, not fundamental error |
| Whether criminal prosecution (burglary) was improper and civil eviction should have been used | Prosecutorial charging decisions rest in prosecutor’s discretion; statutes govern criminal liability | Criminal charges were the wrong remedy; matter should be civil eviction | Court will not second‑guess prosecutorial charging decisions; applies criminal statutes as written; conviction affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Cherry v. State, 57 N.E.3d 867 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (abuse-of-discretion standard for evidentiary rulings)
- Kindred v. State, 973 N.E.2d 1245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (discussion of course-of-investigation evidence)
- Treadway v. State, 924 N.E.2d 621 (Ind. 2010) (appellate review limits on changing appellate objections)
- Patton v. State, 725 N.E.2d 462 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (liberal relevance standard and Rule 403 review)
- Robey v. State, 7 N.E.3d 371 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (State may rebut defense inferences even with otherwise objectionable testimony)
- Cole v. State, 28 N.E.3d 1126 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (invited error doctrine bars complaint about elicited testimony)
- Grott v. State, 30 N.E.3d 777 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (prosecutor’s charging discretion)
- An‑Hung Yao v. State, 975 N.E.2d 1273 (Ind. 2012) (court will apply criminal statutes as written; not substitute civil remedies)