Stephanie Brown v. Allen Sessoms
413 U.S. App. D.C. 328
| D.C. Cir. | 2014Background
- Stephanie Brown, a long-serving Black female associate professor at UDC’s law school (DCSL), applied for tenure and promotion in 2009; the DCSL Faculty Evaluation and Retention Committee recommended tenure but the Dean and then-Interim Provost initially resisted; Dean later endorsed the recommendation but Provost Graeme Baxter rejected the application in June 2011 and President Allen Sessoms concurred, so the Board never voted.
- Brown alleges a similarly situated white male colleague, William McLain, lacked the required publications yet received tenure in 2010 after being credited for other legal contributions, while Brown—who also lacked three published law-review articles at filing but had other scholarship and service—was denied.
- Brown sued in D.C. Superior Court asserting seven claims (breach of contract; breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing; wrongful termination; DCHRA race and sex discrimination; 42 U.S.C. § 1981 race discrimination; negligent supervision; negligent infliction of emotional distress); defendants removed to federal court and moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
- The district court dismissed all claims; Brown appealed. The D.C. Circuit reviews de novo and accepts factual allegations as true for motion-to-dismiss analysis.
- The panel held that Brown sufficiently pleaded federal race-discrimination claims under § 1981 (and DCHRA) based on differential treatment of a similarly situated white colleague, but affirmed dismissal of her breach-of-contract and covenant-of-good-faith claims and negligent supervision claim; the court remanded the § 1981 and DCHRA claims for further proceedings and allowed Brown to add a § 1983 citation per Johnson.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Viability of § 1981 claim against public university defendants | Brown alleged race discrimination in tenure decisions and pointed to a similarly situated white colleague who received tenure despite comparable publication shortfall | Defendants argued § 1981 cannot be sued against state actors without § 1983 (relying on Jett) and that dismissal was proper for failure to plead a prima facie case | Court treated Jett and Johnson together: allowed § 1981 pleading to proceed (Johnson permits pleading without explicit § 1983), and found Brown pleaded sufficient facts (similarly situated comparator and adverse action) to survive dismissal |
| DCHRA discrimination claim | Brown asserted race and sex discrimination under DCHRA using McDonnell Douglas framework and same comparator evidence | Defendants argued failure to plead prima facie case and insufficient facts | Court reversed dismissal and remanded; same reasoning as § 1981 claim (McDonnell Douglas framework applies) |
| Breach of contract (Merger Agreement / Faculty Handbook) | Brown contended Merger Agreement and Handbook required Board review/approval and that procedural obligations were breached by not forwarding her application to the Board | Defendants pointed to Merger Agreement language showing President (via Provost) has final approval and no Board review was required; no breach alleged | Court affirmed dismissal: no contractual breach shown because President had final approval authority under the agreement |
| Breach of implied covenant of good faith and negligent supervision | Brown claimed defendants interfered with her contractual expectations and failed to supervise officials who mishandled tenure | Defendants argued Brown had no contractual right to tenure and alleged facts were speculative about supervisory knowledge or wrongdoing | Court affirmed dismissal: covenant claim fails because there was no contractual right to tenure; negligent supervision claim speculative and insufficiently pleaded |
Key Cases Cited
- Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989) (§ 1981 claims against state actors are subject to § 1983 remedies)
- Johnson v. City of Shelby, 135 S. Ct. 346 (2014) (plaintiffs need not plead § 1983 specifically to state a claim for constitutional violations; pleading facts is sufficient)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden‑shifting framework for discrimination cases)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (complaint must plead facts that raise claim above speculative level)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (complaint must contain factual content allowing reasonable inference of liability)
- Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470 (2006) (§ 1981 protects right to make and enforce contracts)
- Paul v. Howard Univ., 754 A.2d 297 (D.C. 2000) (no contractual right to tenure; limits on good-faith-and-fair-dealing claim)