Stephanie Britt v. Savannah Sharks Cheerleading, LLC
A24A1727
Ga. Ct. App.Mar 14, 2025Background
- Stephanie Britt, a long-time cheerleading coach and founder of Cheer Savannah, was banned for life from participating in US All Star Federation (USASF) events after an investigation by TNG Consulting, reportedly triggered by complaints from competitors and a former team parent.
- Britt alleged that competitors (Savannah Sharks Cheerleading and Megan Yarbrough) and Meagan Dwyer, a parent, conspired to spread false, damaging statements to USASF and others, leading to her ban and harming her career.
- Britt sued for defamation/libel/slander and tortious interference with business relations, claiming the false statements were not matters of public concern but private disputes.
- The defendants filed anti-SLAPP motions under OCGA § 9-11-11.1 to dismiss the complaint, arguing their statements about Britt concerned a matter of public interest and were protected speech.
- The trial court granted the anti-SLAPP motions (dismissing the case), found the motions timely, and denied Britt’s request for limited discovery; Britt appealed.
- The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals, upheld the rulings on timeliness/discovery, but vacated the dismissal because the trial court failed to conduct an adequate anti-SLAPP analysis as required by statute.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of Anti-SLAPP Motions | Motions were untimely, filed >90 days after service | No clear statutory deadline; motions were timely | Motions were timely; no statutory deadline for initial filing |
| Applicability of Anti-SLAPP to Private Statements | Statements were private, not public concern | Statements on child safety are public concern | Analysis incomplete; remand for proper statutory analysis |
| Denial of Limited Discovery | Entitled to discovery for anti-SLAPP motion | No good cause; discovery sought too late | Denial affirmed; no abuse of discretion, new arguments waived |
| Grant of Anti-SLAPP Motion (Dismissal) | Claims have probability of prevailing | No likelihood of success; protected speech | Dismissal vacated; incomplete step 1 analysis, remanded for more |
Key Cases Cited
- Wilkes & McHugh v. LTC Consulting, 306 Ga. 252 (Ga. 2019) (interpreting 2016 changes to Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute and requirements for protected activity determination)
- Equity Prime Mtg. v. Greene for Congress, 366 Ga. App. 207 (Ga. Ct. App. 2022) (sets forth two-step analysis for anti-SLAPP motions)
- Land v. Boone, 265 Ga. App. 551 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (discussed prior anti-SLAPP statutory scheme and analogies to procedural deadlines)
- Ga. Community Support & Solutions v. Berryhill, 275 Ga. App. 189 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (explained public concern limitation on Georgia’s anti-SLAPP law)
- Lapolla Indus. v. Hess, 325 Ga. App. 256 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) (issues not raised below are waived on appeal)