872 N.W.2d 92
S.D.2015Background
- On April 12, 2009 Harding County received notice a culvert washout existed on County Road 734; the County placed Type I barricades and cones but not the Type III barricade/configuration required by the MUTCD. An unknown person moved some devices and placed a delineator in the washout.
- The County conceded it did not comply with the MUTCD; plaintiff sought a pretrial finding of negligence per se under SDCL 31-28-6 and SDCL 31-32-10; the trial court instructed the jury that the County breached its duty (negligence per se).
- On May 16, 2009 Stensland drove at night into the washed-out section, injuring his left leg; he testified he did not see adequate warning signs and thought the delineator marked the road edge.
- At trial the County disputed that its noncompliance was the proximate cause and presented evidence that signs/barricades in place should have or did put drivers on notice; evidence included prior warnings Stensland had heard and photos of signs out of place.
- Stensland moved for judgment as a matter of law on County liability and on the County’s defenses (contributory negligence and assumption of risk); the court denied those motions and submitted causation, contributory negligence, and assumption-of-risk to the jury. A general verdict favored the County.
- The Supreme Court affirmed, holding negligence per se does not eliminate the need to prove causation and that there was sufficient evidence to submit contributory negligence and assumption-of-risk to the jury.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether County’s admitted violation of SDCL/MUTCD entitles Stensland to JMOL on County liability | County’s statutory violation = negligence per se; therefore no issue for jury and JMOL required | Violation does not automatically establish liability because causation and damages must still be proved | Denied JMOL; negligence per se (breach) does not eliminate causation requirement; jury could find lack of proximate cause |
| Whether causation was resolved as a matter of law | Causation undisputed and flows from statutory violation | County disputed proximate cause, pointing to warning devices, plaintiff’s knowledge, and relocated signs | Court held causation was for jury; evidence supported reasonable dispute |
| Whether court should have granted JMOL on contributory negligence / assumption of risk or refused instructions | Stensland argued insufficient evidence supported these defenses; instructions prejudicial | County argued evidence supported defenses and they should go to jury | Court affirmed submission to jury; evidence supported both defenses |
| Whether County was required to follow MUTCD on non–federally aided county roads (County’s cross-review) | (not reached by plaintiff) | County argued SDCL 31-28-6 does not mandate MUTCD for non–federal-aid roads | Court affirmed verdict and did not decide the County’s statutory interpretation issue on review |
Key Cases Cited
- Huether v. Mihm Transp. Co., 857 N.W.2d 854 (2014) (standard for reviewing denial of JMOL; view evidence most favorably to verdict)
- Baddou v. Hall, 756 N.W.2d 554 (2008) (discusses negligence per se where safety statute violation admitted)
- Thompson v. Summers, 567 N.W.2d 387 (1997) (statutory violation alone insufficient; proximate cause required)
- Janis v. Nash Finch Co., 780 N.W.2d 497 (2010) (elements of negligence include duty, breach, causation, damages)
- Stone v. Von Eye Farms, 741 N.W.2d 767 (2007) (uses negligence elements standard)
- Blakey v. Boos, 153 N.W.2d 305 (1967) (statutory violation must be proximate cause to impose liability)
- Bertelsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 833 N.W.2d 545 (2013) (JMOL review standard cited)
- Rowland v. Log Cabin, Inc., 658 N.W.2d 76 (2003) (questions of negligence/contributory negligence for jury when evidence exists)