Steidinger v. Blackstone Medical Services
1:24-cv-01074
| C.D. Ill. | Jul 21, 2025Background
- Plaintiffs (Jones, Steidinger, Koller) brought a class action against Blackstone Medical Services, LLC, alleging repeated unwanted telemarketing texts and calls to numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry and after requests to stop.
- The complaint asserts violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) Sections 227(c) and the Florida Telephone Solicitation Act (FTSA).
- Plaintiffs sought monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief on behalf of several putative classes defined by receipt of unwanted text messages or calls.
- Blackstone, a Florida-based company selling home sleep tests, moved to dismiss the TCPA claims (Counts I-IV) under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
- The dispute centered on whether TCPA Section 227(c) applies to unsolicited text messages, as opposed to only phone calls.
- The court ruled on the motion to dismiss, also declining supplemental jurisdiction over the FTSA claim (Count V) due to the dismissal of the federal claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the TCPA § 227(c) cover unsolicited text messages? | "Calls" in TCPA should be interpreted to include text messages, per FCC orders and public policy. | The statutory text and regulations under § 227(c) refer only to "calls," not text messages; FCC only extended "calls" to texts under § 227(b). | TCPA § 227(c) does not apply to text messages; motion to dismiss granted. |
| Should courts defer to FCC interpretation that texts constitute "calls" under § 227(c)? | The FCC's 2003 and later orders unambiguously treat texts as "calls." | FCC orders interpreting "calls" as including texts apply to § 227(b), not § 227(c); deference is inappropriate. | Court not bound by FCC's interpretation; follows plain statutory text. |
| Does the term "telephone call" in 1991 statute include text messages? | Modern usage and public policy favor broad reading to include texts. | Statutory language from 1991 predates text messaging; "telephone call" then did not include texts. | Statute should be read according to its 1991 meaning; "telephone call" does not include text messages. |
| Should federal court retain supplemental jurisdiction over remaining FTSA claim? | Not at issue for Plaintiffs in briefing. | Court should refuse jurisdiction if federal claims are dismissed. | Court declines supplemental jurisdiction over FTSA claim. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading standard for Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss)
- Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368 (2012) (TCPA background and purpose)
- Pisciotta v. Old Nat'l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007) (motion to dismiss standard for evaluating facts in plaintiffs' favor)
- U.S. v. Melvin, 948 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2020) (plain meaning rule and statutory interpretation)
- Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 571 U.S. 220 (2014) (words are interpreted in their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning)
- BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. U.S., 541 U.S. 176 (2004) (plain statutory text controls if unambiguous)