Steed v. Rezin Orthopedics and Sports Medicine, S.C., 182 N.E.3d 109

In February 2009 Glenn Steed suffered a partial Achilles-tendon tear; Dr. Treacy at Rezin Orthopedics placed his lower right leg in a plantar-flexion cast and directed a two-week follow-up.
Reception staff scheduled cast placement promptly but did not schedule the two-week follow-up as written on the super bill; the follow-up was ultimately set for March 13 (then moved to March 12) instead of the two-week date (March 3).
Glenn complained of leg tightness and achiness after casting and called the clinic on February 25; his symptoms partly improved with elevation/ice, and he first reported thigh pain on March 7.
Glenn died suddenly of a saddle pulmonary embolism on March 8, 2009; plaintiff sued Rezin for institutional negligence (failure to schedule/communicate) alleging the missed two-week visit proximately caused death.
A jury returned a defense verdict; the appellate court reversed and entered judgment n.o.v. for plaintiff on liability and remanded for damages; the Illinois Supreme Court granted review.
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and affirmed the trial court, holding proximate cause and foreseeability were questions for the jury and that the Pedrick standard for judgment n.o.v. was not met.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether judgment n.o.v. should be entered for plaintiff on liability (proximate cause)	Rezin’s receptionists breached the written order to schedule a two-week follow-up; evidence overwhelmingly shows an earlier exam would have diagnosed/treated the DVT and prevented death	Causation was disputed: experts testified the DVT could have formed after the two-week window and the fatal embolism was medically unforeseeable; reasonable minds could differ	Judgment n.o.v. improperly granted by appellate court; reversed. Jury verdict in favor of defendant stands because evidence did not so overwhelmingly favor plaintiff as to preclude contrary verdict (Pedrick standard not met).
Whether the jury verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence (new trial)	Plaintiff argued the evidence compels finding Rezin’s negligence caused death	Defendant argued substantial evidence supported jury’s causation finding and credibility determinations	Trial court did not abuse discretion; new-trial motion denied. Jury verdict not manifestly erroneous.
Whether trial errors (admission/exclusion of evidence and closing-argument comments) require a new trial	Plaintiff contended certain evidence rulings and defense argument were prejudicial	Defendant maintained any errors were harmless and not outcome-determinative	Court declined to reach these issues as dispositive; in any event, errors (if any) were not shown to have denied a fair trial.

Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill.2d 494 (Ill. 1967) (establishes high standard for judgment n.o.v.: evidence must so overwhelmingly favor movant that no contrary verdict could stand)
York v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Med. Ctr., 222 Ill.2d 147 (Ill. 2006) (discusses Pedrick standard and limits on substituting court judgment for jury)
Lazenby v. Mark’s Constr., Inc., 236 Ill.2d 83 (Ill. 2010) (addresses presumption created by a general verdict and review of jury findings)
Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Ill., 191 Ill.2d 278 (Ill. 2000) (recognizes institutional/corporate negligence principles applicable to healthcare entities)
First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill.2d 252 (Ill. 1999) (settings for Pedrick review and JNOV standards)
Lee v. Chicago Transit Authority, 152 Ill.2d 432 (Ill. 1992) (distinguishes cause in fact and legal (foreseeability) cause)
Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill.2d 1 (Ill. 2003) (explains deference to jury on credibility and factual inferences)
Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill.2d 445 (Ill. 1992) (explains circumstances warranting new trial when verdict is against manifest weight)