Stearns v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 117 N.E.3d 694

Wayne Oliver worked as a pipe inspector and was exposed to asbestos while turbines with asbestos-containing insulation were installed at two nuclear plants in the 1970s; he was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2015 and died in 2016.
Oliver (through his estate) sued multiple defendants, including General Electric (GE), alleging negligent exposure during design, manufacture, sale, and supervision of turbine installation that specified asbestos insulation.
GE moved for summary judgment arguing G. L. c. 260, § 2B (a six-year statute of repose for improvements to real property) barred the claims because exposure occurred in the 1970s and the plants opened in 1972 and 1975.
The federal district judge found the turbines were improvements to real property but denied GE’s motion, citing uncertainty whether § 2B should apply to diseases with long latency or to defendants who retained control of the improvement.
The district court certified the legal question to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court: whether § 2B can bar personal‑injury claims from long‑latency diseases (e.g., asbestos) when defendants had knowing control at time of exposure.
The SJC answered: § 2B wholly bars such tort claims after the six‑year repose period, even for long‑latency diseases and even if a defendant had knowing control of the instrumentality at exposure; relief, if any, is legislative.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether G. L. c. 260, § 2B can bar tort claims based on diseases with extended latency (e.g., asbestos) where defendant had control at time of exposure	§ 2B should not apply to long‑latency diseases or to defendants who retained control because it would extinguish meritorious claims before they arise	§ 2B’s plain six‑year repose limits liability for improvements to real property regardless of latency or defendant’s control	§ 2B applies: it abolishes covered tort claims after six years from opening or substantial completion, even for long‑latency diseases and even when defendant had knowing control at exposure

Bridgwood v. A.J. Wood Constr., 480 Mass. 349 (discusses § 2B purpose and enforces six‑year repose for construction professionals)
Joslyn v. Chang, 445 Mass. 344 (explains repose bars actions regardless of discovery and resists implied exceptions)
Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701 (background on legislative purpose to limit construction liability)
Nett v. Bellucci, 437 Mass. 630 (statutes of repose cannot be tolled; they abolish causes of action)
Tindol v. Boston Hous. Auth., 396 Mass. 515 (repose abolishes remedy, not merely bars action)
Keene (Boston v. Keene Corp.), 406 Mass. 301 (discusses legislative choice to revive some asbestos claims for public entities)
Aldrich v. ADD Inc., 437 Mass. 213 (confirms § 2B eliminates causes of action after six years)