Steadman, Jeffrey Dee, PD-0288-15

Jeffrey Dee Steadman was previously convicted after a jury trial of multiple counts (aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency) and those convictions were reversed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals for a public-trial violation; the cause was remanded.
On remand Steadman pleaded guilty to a single count of aggravated sexual assault of a child and the State agreed to waive other counts and cap punishment at 45 years.
At the bench punishment hearing Steadman testified he had taken responsibility for his conduct but explained he pleaded not guilty at the earlier trial because he feared for his life.
During State closing argument at punishment, the prosecutor said Steadman had "put [the children] through a trial" and by extension "called them liars in front of a jury," implying punishment for Steadman’s prior decision to proceed to jury trial.
Defense objected as an improper comment on the exercise of the constitutional right to a jury trial; the trial court overruled, allowing the State to make "reasonable inferences."
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the prosecutor’s remarks were a reasonable inference from the evidence; appellant sought discretionary review arguing the remarks impermissibly penalized the exercise of the right to a jury trial and the error was harmful.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Steadman)	Held
Whether prosecutor’s punishment‑phase argument impermissibly commented on defendant’s exercise of the right to a jury trial	Remarks were a reasonable inference from Steadman’s testimony that he pleaded not guilty earlier and tried to avoid responsibility	Argument improperly penalized Steadman for exercising his constitutional right to a jury trial and thus was impermissible	Court of Appeals: not error — argument was a reasonable inference; trial court did not abuse discretion
Whether overruling the objection required reversal or remand for new punishment hearing	Any error was non‑constitutional or harmless given overwhelming punishment evidence and bench trial context	Even if error occurred it was likely harmful because argument targeted the exercise of a constitutional right and could have influenced punishment	Court of Appeals: even if error, it was non‑reversible under Rule 44.2(b) given context and evidence

Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (penalty may not be imposed for exercising a constitutional right)
Villarreal v. State, 860 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. App. — Waco 1993) (improper prosecutorial comments equating exercise of trial rights with victim harm can require reversal on punishment)
Alejandro v. State, 493 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (authoritative list of permissible jury argument categories)
Gipson v. State, 844 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (overruled presumption that trial court ignored improper argument; discusses harm analysis)
Ex parte Lane, 303 S.W.3d 702 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (standard for assessing whether prejudicial argument undermines confidence in outcome)