State v. Zuniga
512 S.W.3d 902
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2017Background
- Zuniga was pulled over for running a stop sign; officer observed a medicine bottle and, after arrest, saw her reach into her groin and appear to swallow something. Medical staff found no controlled substance on purge and no blood/other testing was done.
- The State indicted Zuniga for tampering with physical evidence; the indictment originally left blank the identity of the item allegedly altered/destroyed/concealed and was later amended by handwriting to say "an unknown substance."
- Zuniga moved to quash the indictment, arguing it failed in form and substance and did not adequately inform her of the acts alleged or the identity of the tampered item, preventing preparation of a defense.
- The trial court granted the motion to quash, concluding Article 21.02 requirements were not met and the indictment failed to inform the defendant of the acts the State would rely on to prove tampering.
- The court of appeals reversed, holding the specific identity of the tampered item is not an element of the offense and that "unknown substance" sufficed to allege a "thing" under Tex. Penal Code § 37.09.
- The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals agreed that identity is not an element but remanded for the court of appeals to address whether the indictment (as amended) provided adequate notice of the charged conduct.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the specific identity of the tampered-with item is an essential element of tampering with physical evidence (Tex. Penal Code § 37.09) | Zuniga: indictment must allege what was altered/destroyed/concealed; identity is necessary for notice and to prepare a defense | State: identity is evidentiary; statute only requires alleging a "record, document, or thing"; identity need not be pleaded | Court: Identity is not an element; alleging a "thing" (here "unknown substance") satisfies the elements absent the corpse exception |
| Whether the amended indictment ("an unknown substance") provided constitutionally/statutorily adequate notice of the charged conduct | Zuniga: "unknown substance" does not describe the act or the thing sufficiently and thus fails to inform her of the acts the State will rely on | State: even if identity isn't an element, indictment must still give sufficient notice; here "unknown substance" is adequate because specific identity is unknowable | Court: The court of appeals did not sufficiently analyze adequacy of notice under the two-step test; remanded for the court of appeals to decide whether the statutory language as pleaded was sufficiently descriptive to permit defense preparation |
Key Cases Cited
- Smith v. State, 309 S.W.3d 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (indictment sufficiency is a question of law reviewed de novo)
- State v. Barbernell, 257 S.W.3d 248 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (tracking statutory language normally suffices; statutory language may be insufficient when not completely descriptive)
- Lawrence v. State, 240 S.W.3d 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (constitutional right to fair notice of charged offense)
- Mays v. State, 967 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (undefined statutory terms of variable meaning require more specific pleading)
- Williams v. State, 270 S.W.3d 140 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (elements of tampering statute explained)
- State v. Jarreau, 512 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (two-step notice analysis: identify elements, then determine whether statutory language is sufficiently descriptive)
- Haecker v. State, 571 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (charging instrument must set forth plain, intelligible language sufficient to enable defense preparation)
