State v. Youngman, 48421

Officer Klitch observed multiple driving issues (e.g., following too closely, crossing fog line/failing to maintain lane) and initiated a traffic stop; vehicle took ~36 seconds to pull over after lights activated.
On contact, Klitch observed signs of impairment: extremely rapid speech, glassy/bloodshot eyes, dilated pupils, and a needle mark on Youngman’s arm.
Klitch conducted a Romberg test (Youngman failed/gave incorrect time estimate) and an HGN test (2 of 6 indicators); Youngman refused further standardized field sobriety tests and declined consent to search the vehicle.
Klitch arrested Youngman for DUI, searched him incident to arrest and found a bag of heroin in his pocket; a drug dog later alerted and a vehicle search uncovered methamphetamine and additional heroin.
Youngman moved to suppress, arguing lack of probable cause for the DUI arrest; the district court denied suppression. Youngman entered a conditional guilty plea to heroin trafficking and appealed the denial; the appellate court affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Youngman)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether Sergeant Klitch had probable cause to arrest Youngman for driving under the influence	Evidence did not support probable cause; officer’s observations were insufficient	Officer had multiple articulable facts supporting a reasonable belief Youngman was drug-impaired	Affirmed: totality of facts established probable cause
Admissibility/weight of the Romberg test and DRE training	Romberg is not a standardized test and Klitch’s DRE certification had lapsed, so they’re unreliable	Romberg is relevant (Klitch learned it in DRE training) and prior training/experience remain probative despite lapsed certification	Court gave Romberg and officer’s DRE-based observations weight; lapse did not negate specific observations
Relevance of HGN and ocular indicators	Only 2 of 6 HGN indicators; HGN detects depressants, not stimulants, so it’s weak support	HGN result was consistent with officer’s stimulant suspicion and ocular signs were corroborative	Court properly considered HGN and eye observations as consistent with other indicators
Challenge to certain traffic findings (speeding, lane crossing)	Speeding finding lacked evidence; fog line crossing may be duplicative of lane failure	Even if one traffic finding was unsupported, remaining facts independently support probable cause	Minor factual errors (speeding) don’t alter conclusion; probable cause remains supported

State v. Atkinson, 916 P.2d 1284 (Ct. App. 1996) (bifurcated review of suppression rulings; defer to trial court fact findings)
State v. Valdez-Molina, 897 P.2d 993 (1995) (trial court credibility and factual resolution control on suppression)
State v. Schevers, 979 P.2d 659 (Ct. App. 1999) (trial court factfinding entitled to deference)
State v. Julian, 922 P.2d 1059 (1996) (probable cause standard is objective; lower than conviction proof)
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (probable cause permits reasonable mistakes by officers)
State v. Kerley, 11 P.3d 489 (Ct. App. 2000) (probable cause allows reasonable errors that sensibly lead to arrest)
State v. Rocha, 335 P.3d 586 (Ct. App. 2014) (refusal to perform field sobriety tests is relevant to consciousness of guilt)