State v. Young, 818 S.E.2d 486

Background

In September 2012 a confrontation between Aaron Young, Jr. and Tyrone Robinson escalated to multiple exchanges of gunfire; a bystander (a minor) was fatally shot during the course of the events.
The State charged Young, Jr. with murder (for the bystander’s death) under a mutual combat theory and with attempted murder of Robinson.
Evidence: Robinson initially fired at the Youngs; the Youngs retrieved a semi-automatic pistol and pursued Robinson in a truck; Young, Jr. assembled and fired a semi-automatic (including firing ~20 rounds into Robinson’s parked car); Robinson fired back and fired the fatal shot that struck the bystander.
Young, Jr. admitted in a police interview he intended to shoot Robinson, knew children were present, and that his gun had jammed at times.
Young, Jr. moved for directed verdicts and requested a jury instruction on the end of mutual combat; the trial court denied these motions. He was convicted of murder and attempted murder and sentenced to concurrent 30-year terms.
On appeal, Young, Jr. argued (1) mutual combat is not a basis for murder in South Carolina, (2) transferred intent should not apply in mutual combat when a bystander is killed, (3) the jury should have been charged on the end of mutual combat, and (4) insufficient evidence supported attempted murder; the court affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Young, Jr.'s Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether mutual combat is a legally cognizable basis for murder	Mutual combat is only a limitation on self-defense and cannot support a murder conviction	South Carolina law recognizes mutual combat as a basis for murder; prior decisions permit conviction of participants for deaths arising from mutual combat	Affirmed: mutual combat remains a viable theory for murder in SC
Whether transferred intent can apply when a bystander (not a combatant) is killed in mutual combat	Transferred intent should not apply to mutual combat to hold participant criminally liable when another combatant fired the fatal shot	Transferred intent applies; under mutual combat all participants are responsible for natural consequences, and admissions show awareness of bystanders and intent	Affirmed: transferred intent and mutual-combat liability apply; Young, Jr. can be guilty though he did not fire fatal shot
Whether the trial court should have charged the jury on end-of-mutual-combat (withdrawal)	Fleeing after shooting the vehicle amounted to withdrawal and ended mutual combat, so a withdrawal instruction was warranted	No good-faith withdrawal or communication of withdrawal; conduct showed intent to continue conflict	Affirmed: no abuse of discretion refusing the charge—evidence did not show lawful withdrawal
Whether evidence supported attempted murder conviction of Robinson	Shooting at Robinson’s car did not show Robinson was present or that Young, Jr. intended to kill Robinson	Circumstantial evidence (retrieving gun, assembling it, statements admitting Robinson was the target, exchanges of gunfire) supports intent to kill	Affirmed: substantial circumstantial evidence supported attempted murder submission to jury

Key Cases Cited

State v. Andrews, 73 S.C. 257, 53 S.E. 423 (1906) (recognizes mutual combat can support murder or manslaughter depending on malice/heat of passion)
State v. Brown, 108 S.C. 490, 95 S.E. 61 (1918) (holds all participants in mutual combat may be responsible for a death as a natural consequence)
State v. Mathis, 174 S.C. 344, 177 S.E. 318 (1934) (upholds murder charge where parties armed and fired upon each other)
State v. Graham, 260 S.C. 449, 196 S.E.2d 495 (1973) (elements of mutual combat: mutual intent/willingness, antecedent agreement or ill will, parties armed and aware)
State v. Taylor, 356 S.C. 227, 589 S.E.2d 1 (2003) (notes doctrine of mutual combat exists though less commonly used)
State v. Horne, 282 S.C. 444, 319 S.E.2d 703 (1984) (transferred intent doctrine: malice/intent to kill transfers to actual victim)
State v. Lollis, 343 S.C. 580, 541 S.E.2d 254 (2001) (circumstantial-evidence standard for submitting case to jury)
State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 625 S.E.2d 641 (2006) (any substantial direct or circumstantial evidence requires submission to jury)