State v. Yost
2014 ND 209
| N.D. | 2014Background
- Dale Yost was charged with multiple counts of gross sexual imposition and was appointed counsel (William Hartl).
- Yost sought substitute court-appointed counsel; his first request to the indigent defense commission was denied.
- While represented, Yost entered Alford pleas to five counts; sentencing was continued for a presentence investigation.
- Before sentencing Yost filed letters with the court alleging ineffective assistance by Hartl; Hartl moved to withdraw and the court granted withdrawal.
- The court allowed Yost to reapply to the Commission for new counsel but later treated his second application and letters as the functional equivalent of waiving the right to counsel, denied new appointment, and proceeded to sentence Yost in January 2014 without counsel.
- The Supreme Court reversed, holding the record did not establish a knowing, intelligent waiver of counsel and remanded for resentencing with appointed counsel.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the record shows Yost knowingly and intelligently waived right to counsel | Yost’s repeated requests for new appointed counsel and letters amounted to conduct functionally equivalent to a voluntary waiver | Yost did not make an unequivocal pro se request, did not intend to represent himself, and was not warned that applications could be treated as waiver | Reversed: waiver not established; record does not show knowing, intelligent waiver |
| Whether the court properly treated reapplication for appointed counsel as functional equivalent of waiver | Court and State argued court could treat persistent requests as waiver per prior cases | Yost argued court expressly permitted reapplication and therefore should have warned him if denial would be treated as waiver | Court erred: permitting reapplication then treating it as waiver without warning was improper |
| Whether sentencing without counsel violated right to counsel at critical stage | State contended Yost effectively waived and sentencing could proceed | Yost argued sentencing is a critical stage requiring counsel and he did not voluntarily waive that right | Held that sentencing without appointed counsel (given lack of valid waiver) was error; remand for resentencing with counsel |
| Whether court should have warned defendant of dangers of self-representation before treating conduct as waiver | State relied on precedent that colloquy not always required; conduct may suffice | Yost said he was never warned and did not understand withdrawing/complaints could lead to no counsel | Court required a warning here given facts; failure to warn contributed to invalid waiver determination |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Murchison, 687 N.W.2d 725 (N.D. 2004) (standard for knowing, intelligent waiver of counsel and de novo review of denial of right to counsel)
- State v. Harmon, 575 N.W.2d 635 (N.D. 1997) (repeated requests for substitute counsel and refusal to cooperate can be functional equivalent of waiver)
- State v. Schneeweiss, 630 N.W.2d 482 (N.D. 2001) (conduct can be functional equivalent of pro se waiver; repeated requests after denial relevant)
- State v. Wicks, 576 N.W.2d 518 (N.D. 1998) (excusal of appointed counsel created by defendant’s complaint can deny right to counsel if defendant did not understand consequences)
- State v. Holbach, 735 N.W.2d 862 (N.D. 2007) (unequivocal oral statement not strictly required for waiver; context matters)