2021 Ohio 382
Ohio Ct. App.2021Background
- Vernon L. Yontz II was indicted for aggravated possession of drugs and later accepted into Intervention in Lieu of Conviction (ILC); sentencing and an ILC plan were entered in September 2019.
- As a condition of ILC, Guernsey County Adult Probation required that Suboxone not be an approved medication and mandated a physician-supervised taper (wean) within 60–90 days if the participant was on Suboxone.
- Records show Yontz received Suboxone through December 22, 2019; no records in the trial-court file show Suboxone use after that date or any signed taper plan from the treatment provider.
- On March 23, 2020 Yontz moved to modify his ILC terms to permit use of Suboxone, arguing the taper requirement violated Title II of the ADA and the Equal Protection Clauses.
- The trial court denied the motion on April 27, 2020; Yontz appealed. The appellate court concluded there was no evidence Suboxone use continued and no ongoing violation to remedy, so the appeal was dismissed as moot.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Yontz) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the probation department’s ban/taper requirement for Suboxone, as applied to Yontz, violates Title II of the ADA | The policy is appropriate and no relief is warranted; the State opposed modifying ILC terms | The taper/ban on Suboxone discriminates against persons with opioid-use disorder in violation of Title II ADA | Appeal dismissed as moot — no evidence Yontz used Suboxone after Dec. 2019; no relief available |
| Whether the policy, as applied to Yontz, violates equal protection | The policy is lawful and uniformly applied; no ongoing injury to remedy | The policy treats similarly situated persons differently and infringes equal protection | Appeal dismissed as moot for the same reasons — no justiciable controversy |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Massien, 926 N.E.2d 1282 (Ohio 2010) (describing statutory purpose and operation of ILC)
- Fortner v. Thomas, 257 N.E.2d 371 (Ohio 1970) (courts should refrain from issuing advisory opinions on moot questions)
- Miner v. Witt, 92 N.E. 21 (Ohio 1910) (events rendering proceedings incapable of redress require dismissal)
- United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 253 U.S. 113 (1920) (federal courts lack power to decide moot questions)
- North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244 (1971) (mootness is jurisdictional)
- Pewitt v. Lorain Correctional Inst., 597 N.E.2d 92 (Ohio 1992) (courts may take extrinsic evidence to determine mootness)