943 N.W.2d 791
N.D.2020Background
- In August 2018 Yoney fired a .22 rifle into John and Jane Doe’s house, then forced entry and pointed the rifle at John Doe; during a struggle the rifle discharged into the ceiling.
- A jury convicted Yoney of burglary, attempted murder, terrorizing, reckless endangerment, unlawful possession of a firearm, and violation of a no-contact order.
- The district court sentenced Yoney to 30 years as a dangerous special offender based on firearm use; the State later moved to amend the written judgment to expressly reflect the dangerous-special-offender sentencing.
- On appeal Yoney challenged the attempted-murder jury instruction (use of the culpability term “knowingly”), asserted the verdicts were inconsistent (attempted murder vs reckless endangerment), contested sufficiency of evidence for terrorizing, and argued the court improperly amended the judgment without allowing his response.
- The Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting Yoney’s challenges on invited-error/waiver grounds, reconciling the verdicts, finding sufficient evidence for terrorizing, and holding the post‑sentencing amendment harmless.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Yoney's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether inclusion of “knowingly” in attempted-murder instruction was error | Instruction proper; defendant proposed similar language | Inclusion allowed conviction without intent to kill (non‑cognizable per Swanson) | Waived/invited error — Yoney proposed/agreed to instruction; no obvious error review applies |
| Whether verdicts (attempted murder and reckless endangerment) are inconsistent | Verdicts rest on different conduct: firing at victim vs firing into residence | Same conduct cannot support different culpabilities for same victim | Not inconsistent — jury could find different mens rea for different acts (aiming at John Doe vs firing into house) |
| Sufficiency of evidence for terrorizing (threat) | Evidence of firing into house, forcible entry, and pointing rifle adequate to show threat and fear | Insufficient proof of a threat to commit violence | Sufficient — jury reasonably found a threat and fear of harm; conviction upheld |
| Whether district court erred by amending judgment to show dangerous special offender without allowing response | Amendment corrected an omission; was filed and acted on within the response window | Amending without allowing response was procedural error | Harmless error — sentence already imposed as dangerous special offender; amendment did not affect substantial rights |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Swanson, 930 N.W.2d 645 (N.D. 2019) (holding conspiracy to “knowingly” commit murder can be non‑cognizable because it may not require intent to kill)
- State v. Dockter, 932 N.W.2d 98 (N.D. 2019) (plain/obvious error standard for unpreserved criminal errors)
- State v. Rende, 907 N.W.2d 361 (N.D. 2018) (invited error doctrine bars appellate review of error invited by party)
- State v. Watkins, 898 N.W.2d 442 (N.D. 2017) (obvious error analysis does not apply to invited errors)
- State v. Klose, 657 N.W.2d 276 (N.D. 2003) (approach to reconciling apparently inconsistent jury verdicts)
- State v. Norton, 930 N.W.2d 635 (N.D. 2019) (standard for judgment of acquittal and sufficiency review)
- State v. Laib, 705 N.W.2d 815 (N.D. 2005) (threat may be shown by words, actions, gestures, or other communications)
