2022 Ohio 4298
Ohio2022Background
- Victim alleged multiple violations of a protection order by John Yerkey; Yerkey pled guilty to two fifth-degree felonies and received community control.
- At sentencing the trial court held a restitution hearing; the victim sought $1,615 for lost wages from attending criminal-court hearings (plus other items not awarded).
- The trial court ordered $1,615 restitution for the lost wages; the Seventh District Court of Appeals reversed, holding lost wages for voluntary court attendance are not a direct and proximate result of the offense.
- The State appealed, arguing Marsy’s Law (Ohio Const. art. I, §10a) guarantees victims “full and timely restitution,” including wages lost to attend proceedings.
- The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed: Marsy’s Law did not change the statutory meaning of restitution; restitution remains limited to economic loss directly and proximately caused by the offense.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Yerkey's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Marsy’s Law expanded restitution to cover wages lost attending court | Marsy’s Law’s right to “full and timely restitution” and right to be present mean victim is entitled to lost wages incurred to attend proceedings | Restitution statutes limit recoverable losses to economic detriment directly and proximately caused by the offense; voluntary court attendance is not such a result | Marsy’s Law did not alter statutory meaning; lost wages for attending court are not compensable unless they are a direct and proximate result of the offense |
| Whether the adjectives “full and timely” broaden restitution’s scope | “Full and timely” requires complete and prompt payment — supports broader recovery including attendance wages | Adjectives modify payment timing/amount but do not redefine what qualifies as restitution under existing statutes | “Full and timely” describe how restitution is delivered, not what counts as restitution under law |
| Whether the statutory definition of “economic loss” excludes non-injury wage losses | Marsy’s Law supersedes conflicting statutes so victims should recover foreseeable losses tied to prosecution (e.g., attendance wages) | R.C. defines economic loss as direct and proximate result of the offense and lists injury-related lost income as an example; non-injury attendance wages are not covered | The statutory proximate-cause requirement controls: examples are illustrative, and non-injury attendance wages are not shown to be directly and proximately caused by the offense |
| Whether Marsy’s Law supersedes restitution statutes | Marsy’s Law is self-executing and supersedes conflicting state laws; it should control where conflict exists | Because Marsy’s Law does not define restitution or expressly conflict with the statutory definition, statutes remain operative to define compensable losses | No irreconcilable conflict found; statutes and Marsy’s Law are read together and statutory causation limits remain binding |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Lalain, 136 Ohio St.3d 248 (2013) (employee time spent assisting prosecution is not restitutionable because it is not a direct and proximate result of the offense)
- Centerville v. Knab, 162 Ohio St.3d 623 (2020) (interpretation of voter-approved constitutional provisions looks to ordinary meaning known to voters)
- Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014) (discussion of proximate cause in criminal-liability context)
- Strother v. Hutchinson, 67 Ohio St.2d 282 (1981) (proximate cause explained as foreseeable natural and continuous sequence)
- United States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645 (6th Cir. 2012) (guardian’s lost income for attending proceedings was compensable as proximately caused by the offense)
- Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990) (definition of restitution as restoring a person to position before event)