State v. Wymer, 2019 Ohio 1563

In 2003 Robert Wymer was convicted of two counts of murder (with firearm specifications) and one count of felonious assault (with firearm specification) for shooting into a bar, killing one person and injuring another.
Trial court originally imposed two concurrent 15‑to‑life terms for murder, consecutive to a six‑year felonious‑assault term and a three‑year firearm term, for an aggregate 24 years to life.
The appellate court previously remanded for resentencing on merger grounds; the Ohio Supreme Court then directed resentencing under State v. Foster.
Wymer was resentenced on April 13, 2018 after filing a pro se motion; he asked the court to run the felonious‑assault term concurrently due to participation limits in prison programming.
The trial court recited that it considered R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, merged the murder counts, and again imposed an aggregate 24 years to life by ordering the six‑year and three‑year terms consecutive to the 15‑to‑life murder term.
On appeal Wymer challenged (1) compliance with R.C. 2929.11/2929.12 and use of minimum sanctions, and (2) imposition of various court costs without a finding on his ability to pay.

Issue	Wymer's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether trial court failed to comply with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 and should have imposed lesser sanctions	Trial court ignored his rehabilitative efforts and availability limits to programming; the six‑year term violated the requirement to use minimum sanctions necessary	Trial court expressly considered R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 and had discretion to weigh factors; sentence within statutory range	Affirmed — court properly considered sentencing statutes and sentence not clearly and convincingly contrary to law
Whether trial court erred by imposing costs of prosecution, appointed counsel, and confinement without assessing Wymer's ability to pay	No record support that court considered present or future ability to pay; lengthy incarceration makes payment unlikely	Costs of prosecution are mandatory; defendant did not request waiver at sentencing	Affirmed in part and reversed in part — prosecution costs may be imposed (and can be later waived), but imposition of costs for appointed counsel and confinement vacated for lack of finding/evidence of ability to pay

State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1 (Ohio 2006) (directing remedial sentencing framework after statutory changes)
State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23 (Ohio 2008) (appellate review of felony sentences guided by consideration that trial court expressed it considered R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12)
State v. White, 103 Ohio St.3d 580 (Ohio 2004) (trial court may waive court costs when defendant is indigent)
State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208 (Ohio 2000) (trial court has discretion to assign weight to sentencing factors)
State v. Beasley, 153 Ohio St.3d 497 (Ohio 2018) (court retains jurisdiction to waive, suspend, or modify prosecution costs after sentencing)