562 S.W.3d 311
Mo. Ct. App.2018Background
- Defendant Elliot Williams indicted for first-degree statutory rape and sodomy based on alleged abuse of D.M., who disclosed the abuse six to seven years later at age 15.
- State proffered Audrey Leonard, a forensic interviewer with MSW and over 450 child interviews, to testify generally about patterns of child disclosure (including delayed disclosure); she would not opine on D.M.'s credibility or her interview specifically.
- Defendant moved to exclude Leonard under Missouri's newly amended Section 490.065.2 adopting Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert principles, arguing her opinions were untested, anecdotal, lacked peer review/statistics, and were within jurors’ common knowledge.
- Trial court orally granted the motion, finding Leonard’s testimony would not assist the jury, was based on mere observation (not specialized science), and risked improperly bolstering the victim’s credibility.
- State filed a writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the exclusion; the appellate court made the preliminary writ permanent, directing the trial court to set aside its exclusionary ruling.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility standard to apply | Section 490.065.2 adopts Fed. R. Evid. 702; federal jurisprudence (Daubert/Kumho) governs | Trial court applied Daubert factors and excluded expert | Court: Use three-part Fed. R. Evid. 702 analysis (qualification, relevance, reliability) under §490.065.2; Frye no longer controlling |
| Whether expert is qualified by experience | Leonard is qualified by training, MSW, forensic-interviewer experience (450+ interviews) | Defendant: experience alone insufficient absent testing/statistics | Court: Experience alone can qualify an expert under §490.065.2(1); experience-based opinions are permissible |
| Relevance: will testimony assist jurors on delayed disclosure? | State: Delay in child disclosure is outside ordinary juror knowledge and helps assess credibility | Defendant: Delay is common knowledge (e.g., #MeToo), victim can explain delay at trial | Court: Delayed disclosure is specialized knowledge that will assist the trier of fact; exclusion for lack of relevance was erroneous |
| Reliability: is Leonard’s experience-based testimony admissible without formal studies/statistics? | State: Reliability may rest on specialized experience; Rule 702 allows flexible factors | Defendant: Lacks peer review, known error rates, and empirical support; therefore unreliable | Court: Reliability is flexible; absence of testing/statistics does not per se render experience-based testimony unreliable; trial concerns are for cross-examination |
Key Cases Cited
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (trial courts must ensure expert testimony is relevant and reliable under Rule 702)
- Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (Daubert gatekeeping applies to all expert testimony; experience-based expertise may be reliable)
- State v. Williams, 858 S.W.2d 796 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (expert testimony on child-victim behavior may assist jurors not familiar with such behavior)
- State v. Churchill, 98 S.W.3d 536 (Mo. banc 2003) (distinguishing generalized behavioral testimony—admissible—from particularized credibility opinions—inadmissible)
- State ex rel. Wolfrum v. Wiesman, 225 S.W.3d 409 (Mo. banc 2007) (writ of prohibition appropriate where erroneous pretrial ruling would escape review)
- State v. Baker, 422 S.W.3d 508 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (forensic-interviewer testimony about delayed disclosure admissible)
- United States v. Betcher, 534 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 2008) (expert testimony on delayed disclosure of child abuse can help jury understand victim behavior)