State v. Woodlyn, 91577-6

In summer 2011 David Earl Woodlyn cashed seven checks signed by elderly Dora Kjellerson, withdrawing $1,865 from her account; Kjellerson suffered moderate-to-severe dementia.
Woodlyn admitted cashing the checks but claimed he was authorized to do so and that he gave Kjellerson money or was paid for lawn work.
The State charged second-degree theft, and the trial court instructed the jury on two alternative means: (1) theft by taking (wrongfully obtained) and (2) theft by deception (obtained control by color or aid of deception).
The jury was given a general verdict form and found Woodlyn guilty without being required to unanimously agree on which alternative applied.
On appeal the State initially conceded there was no evidence of theft by taking; the Court of Appeals affirmed as harmless error, reasoning the jury must have relied on deception. The State later withdrew the concession on review.
The Washington Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals’ harmless-error logic but affirmed the conviction on the alternative ground that the record contained sufficient evidence to support both theft-by-taking and theft-by-deception.

Issue	State's Argument	Woodlyn's Argument	Held
Whether appellate courts may treat a general verdict as harmless when one instructed alternative has no evidentiary support	If one alternative is unsupported, court can infer jury relied on the supported alternative, so error is harmless	Jury-unanimity error is not harmless; lack of evidence for an alternative creates due process risk and requires express unanimity or reversal	Rejected: courts may not assume jurors unanimously relied on the supported alternative when another lacks support; harmless-error inference is impermissible
Whether evidence supported conviction under each alternative (theft by taking and by deception)	The State argued the record supports both means and thus the general verdict is valid	Woodlyn conceded deception was supported but argued theft-by-taking lacked sufficient evidence	Held: Record provided sufficient evidence for both alternatives (taking beyond consent and deception), so general verdict upheld

State v. Arndt, 87 Wn.2d 374 (Wash. 1976) (no express unanimity required if each alternative is supported)
State v. Franco, 96 Wn.2d 816 (Wash. 1982) (discussing unanimity and alternative means)
State v. Whitney, 108 Wn.2d 506 (Wash. 1987) (unanimity principles in alternative-means context)
State v. Ortega-Martinez, 124 Wn.2d 702 (Wash. 1994) (due process requires particularized unanimity when alternatives lack support)
State v. Owens, 180 Wn.2d 90 (Wash. 2014) (reiterating unanimity requirement where evidence is insufficient for an alternative)
State v. Wright, 165 Wn.2d 783 (Wash. 2009) (reversal required if impossible to rule out jury reliance on unsupported charge)
State v. Sandholm, 184 Wn.2d 726 (Wash. 2015) (restating rule that express unanimity not required if each alternative supported)
Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813 (U.S. 1999) (federal unanimity concerns and risks of general verdicts masking disagreement)
Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (U.S. 1991) (rejecting distinction between degrees of failure of proof for harmless-error analysis)
State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216 (Wash. 1980) (sufficiency-of-evidence standard)
State v. Clark, 96 Wn.2d 686 (Wash. 1982) (consent can be vitiated by exceeding permitted scope of use)