State v. Woldt
293 Neb. 265
| Neb. | 2016Background
- Officer Davie responded to a report that traffic cones had been knocked down on Highway 275 and heard squealing tires; dispatch said the responsible vehicle was a white Chevrolet pickup.
- Davie located a white pickup driven by Jacob Biggerstaff, motioned him to pull over, and then observed a second pickup driven by Adam Woldt stop behind Biggerstaff.
- Davie smelled alcohol on Biggerstaff, detained him, and then motioned (and possibly verbally requested) Woldt to remain; Davie also smelled alcohol on Woldt, who admitted drinking, turned off his vehicle, handed over keys, and was arrested for DUI.
- Woldt’s breath test later registered a .148 BAC; he moved to suppress the stop, detention, arrest, and statements, but the motion was denied and he was convicted in county court and affirmed by the district court.
- The Nebraska Court of Appeals reversed, applying Brown v. Texas/Lidster balancing and finding the stop unreasonable; the Nebraska Supreme Court granted further review.
- The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding the brief stop reasonable under the Brown balancing test and affirming the district court.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Woldt's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Davie’s brief stop of Woldt was a reasonable, non-arrest seizure under the Fourth Amendment | Stopping Woldt to obtain fresh witness information about possible DUI by Biggerstaff served a grave public concern (DUI), advanced the investigation, and minimally interfered with liberty | The matter under investigation (knocked-down cones) was not a grave public concern; officer could have contacted Woldt later at work, so the at-scene seizure was unnecessary | Stop was reasonable: Brown balancing favors the State (public safety re: DUI, investigatory value, minimal intrusion) |
| Whether Lidster’s reasoning for information-gathering stops applies outside checkpoints | Lidster and Brown apply to non-checkpoint, brief, informational stops; Brown balancing governs all less-intrusive seizures | Lidster is a checkpoint case and should not govern non-checkpoint stops; Brown may not authorize this stop | Lidster/Brown principles and Brown balancing apply to non-checkpoint informational stops; Brown analysis controls |
| Whether prior cases (e.g., Ryland) require reasonable suspicion or probable cause for information-gathering stops | An information-gathering stop can be reasonable under Brown/Lidster without independent reasonable suspicion/probable cause when balancing favors the State | Ryland suggested higher suspicion required for witness stops | Ryland is disapproved to the extent it requires reasonable suspicion/probable cause for Lidster-type information stops |
| Whether the intrusion on liberty was substantial enough to invalidate the stop | The intrusion was slight: Woldt was already stopped behind Biggerstaff and was briefly questioned | Woldt argued any seizure was an unjustified liberty interference absent grave public concern or exigency | Court found the intrusion minimal and outweighed by public safety and investigatory benefits |
Key Cases Cited
- Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (establishes balancing test for seizures less intrusive than arrest: gravity of public concern, advancement of public interest, and severity of intrusion)
- Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004) (approves limited information-gathering stops at checkpoints and directs application of Brown balancing)
- Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (strikes down checkpoints whose primary purpose is general crime control; distinguishes information-gathering checkpoints)
- State v. Ryland, 241 Neb. 74 (1992) (Nebraska case addressing witness stops; court here disapproved it insofar as it required reasonable suspicion for Lidster-type stops)
- State v. Piper, 289 Neb. 364 (2014) (describes standard of review for suppression rulings)
- State v. Dalland, 287 Neb. 231 (2014) (reiterates de novo review for reasonable suspicion/probable cause determinations)
- State v. Pierce, 173 Vt. 151 (2001) (applied Brown factors to brief witness-stop and found brief on-scene questioning reasonable)