State v. Wine
2015 Ohio 4726
Ohio Ct. App.2015Background
- Defendant Douglas J. Wine was originally convicted of gross sexual imposition; this court vacated that conviction and remanded for entry of guilt and sentencing on the lesser-included offense of sexual imposition.
- Four weeks after the appellate judgment (but before the trial court on remand had entered the new conviction), Wine filed a petition for post-conviction relief under R.C. 2953.21 seeking to set aside his conviction and sentence.
- While Wine’s direct appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court was pending, the trial court subsequently entered judgment finding Wine guilty of sexual imposition and sentenced him; the parties agreed to stay the post-conviction proceeding pending the Supreme Court’s decision.
- The Ohio Supreme Court later affirmed this court’s decision; following briefing, the trial court dismissed Wine’s July 23, 2012 post-conviction petition as moot, concluding the appellate vacatur had nullified the conviction targeted by the petition.
- Wine appealed the dismissal claiming the appellate court’s action merely modified (rather than vacated) his conviction and therefore the post-conviction statute’s filing period and subject-matter jurisdiction remain implicated.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Wine) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court correctly dismissed Wine’s July 23, 2012 petition for post-conviction relief as moot | The June 25, 2012 appellate vacatur removed any conviction from which relief could be sought on July 23, 2012; the petition therefore was moot | The June 25, 2012 judgment merely modified the conviction, so the petition should attack the modified/underlying conviction and not be moot | Court affirmed dismissal: petition was moot because the appellate court vacated the original conviction before the petition was filed |
| Whether the appellate ruling tolled or affected the 180-day post-conviction filing period | (Implicit) Vacatur provided the relief sought, so tolling question is inapplicable to a nonexistent judgment | The modification view would mean the 180-day clock should run against the modified conviction | Court treated vacatur as nullifying the original judgment; no post-conviction right existed as to the vacated conviction at filing time |
| Whether cases involving resentencing restart post-conviction time or cure mootness | State distinguishes by noting those cases left underlying convictions intact (resentencing only) | Wine relied on cases where resentencing/remand occurred to argue his case was similar | Court distinguished resentencing cases and held they are inapposite because here the conviction was vacated, not merely resentenced |
| Whether the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction by dismissing as moot | State: trial court properly declined jurisdiction over a moot petition | Wine: dismissal deprived him of ability to seek relief on the conviction as modified | Court applied de novo review and held dismissal proper—mootness justified declining jurisdiction |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Wine, 140 Ohio St.3d 409 (2014) (Ohio Supreme Court decision affirming appellate court and addressing jury instruction on lesser-included offenses)
- Cent. Motors Corp. v. Pepper Pike, 9 Ohio App.3d 18 (8th Dist. 1983) (mootness doctrine: requested relief already obtained removes justiciable controversy)