State v. Wine
2012 Ohio 2837
Ohio Ct. App.2012Background
- Wine was convicted of gross sexual imposition and sentenced after a jury trial in which the victim testified to an assault while sleeping in the same room; the court instructed on lesser offenses including sexual battery and gross sexual imposition; the State conceded polygraph-related issues but offered statements from interviews as admissible; on appeal, the court vacated the conviction for gross sexual imposition and remanded for a finding and sentence on the lesser-included offense of sexual imposition; the key issue is whether the State proved force or threat of force to sustain gross sexual imposition given the victim was asleep during the incident; the court ultimately held the force element was not proven but the lesser offense of sexual imposition was proven beyond a reasonable doubt and remanded for that conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was there sufficient proof of force to suporte gross sexual imposition? | Wine argues no force was shown. | Wine contends the evidence shows only sleeping victim manipulation. | Insufficient force; remand for sexual imposition. |
| Admission of edited polygraph/video evidence | Souel framework governs admissibility of polygraph-related items. | Edited videos should be excluded. | No abuse of discretion; evidence admissible under Souel framework. |
| Jury instructions on lesser-included offenses | Instructions on sexual battery and gross sexual imposition were proper. | Instructions errored by including lesser offenses over objection. | Instruction proper; affirmed on that point; still remanded for sexual imposition. |
| Prosecutor's closing remarks and potential misconduct | Prosecutor engaged in improper vouching or misstatement. | Remarks were within bounds given context. | No reversible error; remarks did not deny a fair trial. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Eskridge, 38 Ohio St.3d 56 (1988) (force can be psychological; parental/authority context may justify less direct coercion)
- State v. Labus, 102 Ohio St. 26 (1921) (force is relative to age, size, strength, and relationship of parties)
- State v. Dye, 82 Ohio St.3d 323 (1988) (authority over a child may justify force for rape/gross sexual imposition offenses)
- State v. Schaim, 65 Ohio St.3d 51 (1992) (for purposes of force in rape, parental-like authority over a young victim may be considered; later limits apply when victim is adult)
- State v. Souel, 53 Ohio St.2d 123 (1978) (polygraph results admissible only with stipulation, cross-exam, and limiting instruction)
