State v. Wilson, 2020 Ohio 1584

Early-morning bench trial: Katherine Wilson was found asleep in the driver’s seat of a parked car with the key in the ignition and the engine running; her license was suspended and she was charged under R.C. 4510.14(A) (driving under OVI suspension).
The state conceded at appeal that the vehicle was not driven (no evidence of actual movement) and did not show who, if anyone, had driven the vehicle to that location.
The trial focused solely on the statutory meaning of “operate” in R.C. 4510.14(A): whether it requires actual or potential movement or instead requires that the defendant caused movement.
The trial court accepted the judicial (pre-2004) definition—operating is broader than driving (actual or potential movement)—and convicted Wilson; she appealed, challenging sufficiency of the evidence.
The First District reviewed the statutory issue de novo and, relying on R.C. 4510.14’s structure, the in pari materia doctrine, and post-2004 legislative changes, held that “operate” for R.C. 4510.14(A) requires that the defendant cause or have caused movement of the vehicle.
Because the state offered no direct or circumstantial evidence that Wilson caused movement, the court reversed the conviction and discharged her.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether “operate” in R.C. 4510.14(A) requires causing movement of the vehicle	The judicial definition (Cleary/Gill) applies: being in driver’s seat with key/engine suffices (actual or potential movement).	“Operate” should be read under R.C. 4511.01(HHH): it means to cause or have caused movement.	Court: “Operate” in R.C. 4510.14(A) requires that the defendant cause or have caused movement; conviction reversed for insufficient evidence.
Whether the post-2004 statutory definition in R.C. 4511.01(HHH) may inform R.C. 4510.14 despite the preamble limiting HHH to Chapters 4511/4513	State: R.C. 4511.01(HHH) is limited to Chapters 4511 and 4513 and therefore does not limit R.C. 4510.14.	Defense: In pari materia and statutory context support applying the R.C. 4511.01(HHH) meaning to 4510.14.	Court: Applied in pari materia and statutory-structure analysis; treated “operate” as requiring movement and relied on legislative scheme (including creation of separate physical-control offense) to support that reading.

State v. Cleary, 22 Ohio St.3d 198, 490 N.E.2d 574 (Ohio 1986) (earlier Ohio Supreme Court held “operate” for OVI can include being in driver’s seat with key, actual or potential movement)
State v. Gill, 70 Ohio St.3d 150, 637 N.E.2d 897 (Ohio 1994) (reaffirmed Cleary: operation may exist even if engine not running; purpose-based expansion to deter potential harmful conduct)
Doe v. Marlington Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 122 Ohio St.3d 12, 907 N.E.2d 706 (Ohio 2009) (used R.C. 4511.01(HHH) by in pari materia to interpret “operation” in a different statutory context)
State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (Ohio 1991) (sets sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard for criminal convictions)
State v. Pountney, 152 Ohio St.3d 474, 97 N.E.3d 478 (Ohio 2018) (statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo)