State v. Wilmer
384 P.3d 32
Kan. Ct. App.2016Background
- Defendant Clayton Deion Wilmer was incarcerated and charged with attempted first-degree murder and related offenses; evidence at preliminary hearing showed he contacted witness/ex-girlfriend Caitlynn Cruce by phone and letters and attempted to influence her testimony.
- The State requested and the district court entered a no-contact order prohibiting Wilmer from any direct or indirect contact with Cruce during the pendency of the criminal case to prevent witness intimidation.
- Wilmer was later charged with 21 counts under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5924(a)(4) for violating the no-contact order between Feb 24 and Apr 22, 2015; he moved to dismiss arguing the court lacked statutory authority to issue such an order for an incarcerated defendant.
- The district court denied the motion; Wilmer was convicted on all counts and sentenced to concurrent 12-month terms.
- On appeal Wilmer argued (1) the district court lacked authority to issue the no-contact order and thus prosecution under §21-5924(a)(4) was improper, and (2) the statute as applied infringed his First Amendment and Kansas Constitution Section 11 rights; he did not contest the evidentiary sufficiency.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a district court may issue a no-contact order during a pending criminal case | None (State sought order to protect witness/testimony) | Wilmer: no statutory authority for court to issue no-contact order for incarcerated defendant | Court: district court has inherent authority to issue such orders to protect fair administration of justice |
| Whether violating such an order may be criminally prosecuted under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5924(a)(4) | State: statute criminalizes violating orders issued during a criminal case; prosecution proper | Wilmer: remedy for violating court order is contempt only, not criminal prosecution | Court: statute unambiguously covers orders issued during criminal cases; criminal prosecution is permissible alongside contempt remedies |
| Whether subsection (a)(4) is ambiguous or requires identification of a statutory source for the order | State: (implicit) language covers any order during criminal case; no additional statutory source required | Wilmer: court lacked statutory authorization; therefore §21-5924(a)(4) inapplicable | Court: statutory text is clear and presumes courts may issue orders during criminal proceedings; no ambiguity or additional statutory predicate required |
| Constitutional challenge to §21-5924(a)(4) as overbroad / First Amendment infringement | Wilmer: statute not narrowly tailored; jail communications could be monitored so blanket ban is unnecessary | State: (responded that Wilmer failed to adequately brief) | Court: Wilmer abandoned constitutional claims by failing to define/brief them; issue waived |
Key Cases Cited
- Wilson v. American Fidelity Ins. Co., 229 Kan. 416 (recognizing courts' inherent powers to administer justice)
- Holt v. State, 290 Kan. 491 (discussing inherent judicial powers at common law and statutory limits)
- Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885 (2016) (describing control vested in courts to manage affairs for orderly disposition of cases)
- Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820 (inherent powers must be reasonable and not conflict with statutes)
- United States v. Neal, 101 F.3d 993 (4th Cir. 1996) (courts may pursue contempt and executive branch may also criminally prosecute conduct violating court orders)
- State v. Frierson, 298 Kan. 1005 (presumption that legislature does not enact meaningless provisions)