State v. Willey, 248 P.3d 1014

Willey, an elementary school teacher, was convicted of sexual abuse of a child based on decade-old memories corroborated by classmates and contemporaneous notes.
The State used students from Child's class and, at the first trial, 404(b) witnesses; at the second trial, it elected not to use the 404(b) witnesses.
Between trials, additional former classmates provided corroborating accounts; administrator notes revealed independent corroboration of inappropriate touching, including genital touching in other districts.
Trial strategy centered on a memory confabulation defense, undermining long-ago memories as potentially distorted, rather than relying on expert testimony.
Willey sought a 23B evidentiary remand to challenge trial counsel's performance and to obtain an expert on memory; the district court found no ineffective assistance and discredited the memory expert’s credibility.
On appeal, Willey challenges the district court’s factual findings and marshaling of the record, arguing counsel should have retained a memory expert.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was trial counsel ineffective for not introducing a memory expert?	Willey argues memory expert was necessary to support memory confabulation defense.	Willey contends counsel’s choice aligned with sound strategy given risk of bolstering State’s case and 404(b) issues.	No; strategic decision within sound trial strategy
Did the district court properly marshaling the evidence to support its factual findings?	Willey asserts the record shows more favorable evidence that was not properly marshaled.	Willey failed to marshal and thus cannot rebut district court findings.	District court findings upheld; marshaling deficiencies not shown
Does State v. Clopten control whether memory expert testimony was required?	Clopten implies a general expectation that memory-related testimony may be wise or necessary.	Clopten is distinguishable and does not create a bright-line rule applicable here.	Clopten distinguished; not controlling
Does a Rule 23B remand imply a presumption of ineffectiveness?	Willey might argue remand signals presumed ineffectiveness.	Remand is a device to develop facts, not a judgment on effectiveness.	Remand does not create a presumption of ineffectiveness

State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84 (2009) (examines memory-related defenses and expert testimony; not a bright-line rule)
Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233 (2009) (marshaling evidence requirement and appellate process)
State v. Hernandez, 2005 UT App 546 (2005) (deference to trial court factual findings after 23B hearing)
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76 (2000) (strong presumption that counsel actions are sound trial strategy)