302 Ga. 156
Ga.2017Background
- Wilkins and Jones were indicted for two 2013 execution-style murders; Jones was tried separately and convicted; Wilkins moved in limine to exclude certain statements Jones made post‑crime to third parties.
- The State sought to admit those statements under the co‑conspirator hearsay exception (OCGA § 24‑8‑801(d)(2)(E)), including statements during the concealment phase.
- The challenged statements included admissions to coworkers, acquaintances, Jones’ estranged wife, Burgess’ stepsister, and co‑conspirator Burgess (including a jail letter asking Burgess to blame Wilkins).
- The trial court excluded six categories of statements made outside Wilkins’ presence, concluding they were not made “in furtherance of the conspiracy.”
- The State appealed, arguing the statements furthered the conspiracy (including concealment) and thus were admissible; Wilkins argued the statements were retrospective or intended to shift blame and thus not within the exception.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Wilkins' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the challenged out‑of‑court statements by Jones are admissible as co‑conspirator statements under OCGA § 24‑8‑801(d)(2)(E) | Statements were made during the concealment phase and/or to further the conspiracy (e.g., securing silence, recruiting help, hiding weapon), so admissible | Statements were retrospective, merely disclosed the crime, or attempted to shift blame — not in furtherance of the conspiracy | Court affirmed exclusion: statements were not shown to be made "in furtherance" and exclusion was not an abuse of discretion |
| Whether statements made during concealment automatically qualify under the new Code | State: new Code expressly includes concealment‑phase statements so these should be admissible | Wilkins: even during concealment, statements must still be in furtherance to qualify | Court: concealment‑phase inclusion preserved, but statements still must be made "in furtherance"; mere concealment or disclosure is insufficient |
| Whether retrospective or blame‑shifting statements qualify as in furtherance | State: some statements could further interests (e.g., keep coconspirator loyal, enlist help) | Wilkins: retrospective recounting or blame shifting does not advance the conspiracy | Court: retrospective or blame‑shifting statements do not further the conspiracy and are inadmissible under the exception |
| Standard of review for admissibility determination | State: seeks deference to trial court but argues record supports admission | Wilkins: trial court factual findings entitled to deference | Court: factual finding whether statement was in furtherance is reviewed for clear error; ultimate decision reviewed for abuse of discretion — no clear error or abuse found |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Miles, 290 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2002) (liberal standard: statement need only further conspiracy’s interests)
- United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1981) (retrospective statements not in furtherance)
- United States v. Posner, 764 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1985) (statements that merely "spill the beans" do not advance conspiracy)
- City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chem., 158 F.3d 548 (11th Cir. 1998) (statements that only inform listener of declarant’s activities are not in furtherance)
- United States v. Blakey, 960 F.2d 996 (11th Cir. 1992) (statements implicating a coconspirator to shift blame are not in furtherance)
- Hassel v. State, 294 Ga. 834 (Ga. 2014) (Georgia law recognizes concealment‑phase statements under prior statute)
- Marchman v. State, 299 Ga. 534 (Ga. 2016) (post‑crime statements can be admissible under co‑conspirator exception when they further conspiracy)
- Franklin v. State, 298 Ga. 636 (Ga. 2016) (jailed co‑conspirator’s incriminating statements admitted under exception)
- Reed v. State, 291 Ga. 10 (Ga. 2012) (factual findings reviewed for clear error; discretionary rulings for abuse of discretion)
- Wright v. State, 300 Ga. 185 (Ga. 2017) (review standard for motion in limine rulings)