State v. WilkesÂ, 17-208

Background

On June 6, 2012, Jermaine Wilkes and Antoine Reid were with victim Brianne Ginty at her home; Reid was Ginty’s boyfriend. Reid and Ginty argued and both men were locked out; Reid cut a window screen with a knife and let Wilkes back into the house. Reid left thereafter and last saw Ginty between 3:00–5:00 a.m.; Reid’s mother said he arrived home at 6:30 a.m.
Around 8:30 a.m. witnesses saw a burning car; officers found Ginty’s burned body inside.
Officers arrested Reid and interviewed him; Reid said he and Wilkes had been locked out and that Reid broke in through the window and let Wilkes back in. Officers found a cut window screen and a knife/chair at the house consistent with that account.
Reid’s mother told officers Wilkes lived on the property and left/was “on the run” after Reid’s arrest; witnesses placed Wilkes on a scooter near the burn site that morning.
Officers later located and handcuffed Wilkes, took him to the sheriff’s department, read Miranda rights, and questioned him (he was not told he was under arrest); Wilkes eventually made incriminating statements.
Wilkes was indicted for first-degree murder, burning personal property, and concealment of death; he moved to suppress his statements arguing the arrest lacked probable cause. The trial court denied suppression; Wilkes pled guilty to second-degree murder and reserved right to appeal the suppression ruling.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Wilkes)	Held
Whether officers had probable cause to arrest Wilkes	Officers had reasonably trustworthy information (cut screen, knife, Reid’s statements, witness sightings) supporting arrest for breaking and entering and possibly more serious crimes	Officers lacked probable cause because evidence tied only Reid to the break‑in and there was insufficient proof the car/body were burned intentionally or that Wilkes committed a crime	Court held the totality of circumstances provided probable cause to arrest Wilkes for breaking and entering; arrest valid even if officers also suspected more serious crimes
Whether Reid’s statements and corroborating facts were sufficiently reliable to support probable cause	Reid’s admissions, corroborated by physical evidence (cut screen, knife/chair) and witness sightings, were reasonably trustworthy	Reid’s statements were insufficiently reliable; probable cause requires more than uncorroborated accusation	Court held corroboration made Reid’s statements sufficiently trustworthy to create a “fair probability” of criminal conduct, satisfying probable cause
Whether arrest for a lesser offense is improper when officers suspect a more serious one	Arrest may be based on any offense for which probable cause exists—even if officers suspect other crimes	Wilkes argued officers needed probable cause for the suspected serious crime (murder) to detain him	Court applied Devenpeck principle: arrest valid if probable cause existed for any offense supported by the facts; suppression denied
Jurisdictional defect in appellant’s notice of appeal	State did not object to certiorari petition; Court may excuse technical defect	Wilkes appealed only suppression order rather than judgments, creating a jurisdictional defect	Court granted writ of certiorari to reach merits because defect was technical and State did not oppose; then affirmed suppression denial

Key Cases Cited

Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (U.S. 1964) (probable cause standard for warrantless arrest)
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (U.S. 1983) (totality of circumstances test for probable cause)
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (U.S. 1981) (probable cause concerns probabilities, not certainties)
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (U.S. 2004) (arrest lawful if supported by probable cause for any offense)
State v. Jackson, 368 N.C. 75 (N.C. 2015) (standard for appellate review of suppression rulings)
State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162 (N.C. 2011) (probable cause need not be prima facie guilt)
State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 99 (N.C. 1991) (de novo review of legal conclusions in suppression rulings)
State v. Crawford, 125 N.C. App. 279 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (probable cause is a “fair probability")