State v. Wilkerson, 478 P.3d 1048

In Aug. 2018 Wilkerson was arrested for drug possession; meth was found and he was booked into Utah County Jail. He spent about 16 days in custody initially, was released on own recognizance, then failed to appear and was rearrested.
After rearrest he spent an additional ~90 days in jail; total pre-plea detention equaled 111 days.
Wilkerson later pleaded to a reduced misdemeanor (attempted possession). The court sentenced him to one year (suspended), placed him on probation, ordered him to “serve 111 days” but credited him for the 111 days already served (so no further jail time).
The State sought, and the district court ordered, restitution under Utah Code § 76-3-201(6) (the Pay‑to‑Stay statute) for the cost of Wilkerson’s 111 days in county jail—$1,939.65.
Wilkerson moved to vacate the restitution order, arguing the statute does not authorize reimbursement for pre‑conviction detention and that the order violated due process; the court denied relief and he appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Pay‑to‑Stay statute authorizes reimbursement for pre‑conviction incarceration	Wilkerson: statute applies only to post‑conviction/post‑sentencing incarceration, so pre‑plea jail time is not recoverable	State: statute authorizes reimbursement for incarceration “before and after sentencing” if the defendant is ultimately convicted of the activity that resulted in incarceration	Court: affirmed. The statute’s plain language covers incarceration before or after sentencing when the defendant is convicted of the criminal activity that resulted in the incarceration; statute unambiguous in this context
Whether Wilkerson’s due process challenges or Rule 22(e) relief were available despite not having raised them below	Wilkerson: Pay‑to‑Stay and its application here are constitutionally deficient and warrant relief even if not fully litigated below	State: claims were not preserved; current Rule 22(e) (post‑2017) is limited; Wilkerson did not meet plain‑error or rule‑based relief standards	Court: affirmed. New due process arguments were unpreserved; current Rule 22(e) does not authorize relief here; Wilkerson failed to show plain error

Grimm v. DxNA LLC, 427 P.3d 571 (Utah Ct. App. 2018) (statutory interpretation reviewed for correctness)
Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 267 P.3d 863 (Utah 2011) (ambiguity requires resort to other interpretive tools)
State v. Watkins, 309 P.3d 209 (Utah 2013) (interpretation cannot contradict plain statutory language)
State v. Houston, 353 P.3d 55 (Utah 2015) (former Rule 22(e) as a limited exception to preservation for facial constitutional challenges)
State v. Candedo, 232 P.3d 1008 (Utah 2010) (historical discussion of Rule 22(e))
Muddy Boys, Inc. v. Dep’t of Commerce, 440 P.3d 741 (Utah Ct. App. 2019) (undefined statutory terms judged by plain and ordinary meaning)