909 N.W.2d 684
N.D.2018Background
- In Nov. 2015 Angila Wilder was stabbed to death; Richie Wilder was charged with murder, convicted by jury, and sentenced to life without parole.
- The original judgment also ordered Wilder to have no contact with his two children for life; Wilder moved to correct sentence.
- The district court amended the no-contact provision to prohibit contact only until the children turn 18, concluding it had statutory and inherent authority and invoking victim-protection provisions of the state constitution.
- On appeal Wilder argued (1) the prosecutor’s closing/rebuttal remarks violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent by commenting on his post‑Miranda, post‑arrest silence, and (2) the no-contact order as part of an executed prison sentence was an illegal sentence because no statute authorizes such a condition.
- The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the conviction, finding the prosecutor’s improper comments harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, but held the no-contact order during imprisonment was an illegal sentence because sentencing statutes do not authorize no-contact conditions for executed prison terms and the constitutional victims’‑rights provision was not invoked by any victim or representative.
Issues
| Issue | Wilder's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether prosecutor’s closing/rebuttal comments improperly used Wilder’s post‑arrest silence in violation of the Fifth Amendment | Prosecutor’s comments invited the jury to infer guilt from Wilder’s failure to tell police about alternative suspect after being Mirandized | Comments were part of argument about inconsistent statements and credibility; not outcome-determinative | Comments were improper (addressed post‑Miranda silence) but harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given strong evidence of guilt |
| Whether a sentencing court may order no contact with victim’s family as part of an executed prison sentence | No — sentencing statutes do not authorize no‑contact conditions for an executed prison term; doing so is an illegal sentence | District court has statutory and inherent authority and victims’‑rights constitutional provisions support protecting child victims | No — sentencing statutes must authorize such additions; no‑contact order for duration of imprisonment is illegal absent statutory authorization |
| Whether N.D. Const. art. I, § 25 (victim’s rights) authorized the court to impose no contact sua sponte | Art. I, § 25 protects victims and allows enforcement, but rights must be asserted by victim/representative | Court relied on art. I, § 25 to justify protective order for children | Art. I, § 25 not available here because no request was made by victim/representative; court will not decide scope of § 25 beyond that point |
| Remedy for illegal no‑contact sentencing provision | Vacatur or modification of the no‑contact term as part of sentence | Sentence should stand as amended (until children turn 18) | Reverse the no‑contact portion of judgment and remand for correction consistent with opinion |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda warnings carry implicit assurance silence will carry no penalty)
- Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (post‑Miranda silence may not be used to impeach defendant)
- State v. Anderson, 875 N.W.2d 496 (N.D. 2016) (using post‑arrest silence for impeachment violates due process; harmless‑error framework)
- State v. Ebach, 589 N.W.2d 566 (N.D. 1999) (comments on defendant’s silence violate rights)
- Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941 (3d Cir. 1998) (prosecutor improperly questioned defendant’s post‑arrest silence)
- United States v. Boyd, 620 F.2d 129 (6th Cir. 1980) (improper to use defendant’s failure to tell police as evidence of guilt)
- Laux v. State, 821 N.E.2d 816 (Ind. 2005) (court may not impose no‑contact order as part of executed life sentence absent statutory authorization)
- State v. Post, 112 P.3d 116 (Kan. 2005) (no‑contact order during executed sentence is illegal when statutes limit conditions to probation/community corrections)
- State v. Pugh, 753 N.W.2d 308 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (same conclusion regarding no‑contact orders and executed sentences)
