209 N.C. App. 522
N.C. Ct. App.2011Background
- Whitted was convicted after a jury trial of multiple offenses including felony breaking and entering of a motor vehicle, larceny, financial transaction card theft and fraud, robbery, false pretenses, forgery, uttering forged instruments, conspiracy, and habitual felon status; sentences were aggregated into consecutive terms totaling well over a century but the court remanded for further proceedings.
- The convictions stemmed from a 2008 series of encounters in Fayetteville with her niece Malloy and three elderly victims, involving distraction, purse theft, and unauthorized use of stolen credit cards and checks.
- Surveillance videos and witness testimony tied Whitted to the thefts and card fraud, and police later found items purchased with a stolen card at Whitted’s home.
- Whitted challenged multiple trial issues on appeal, including identification evidence, admission of out-of-court statements, absence during trial phases, waiver of presence, sentencing discretion, competency, due process, and ineffective assistance.
- The Court of Appeals ultimately remanded to address Whitted’s competency claim (issue VI) and dismissed or reviewed other issues, affirming most convictions while narrowing remand scope.
- The procedural posture involved a trial court that did not conduct a sua sponte competency hearing before trial, prompting appellate remand for a retrospective competency determination.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Competency sua sponte requirement | Whitted exhibited substantial evidence of incompetence (mental illness history; disruptive courtroom conduct). | Defendant's competency was questioned; trial court failed to hold a proper competency hearing. | Remand for retrospective competency determination; if possible, hold a competency hearing; if not, reverse and grant new trial. |
| Admission of identification evidence | Navarro’s lay identification testimony connected Whitted to surveillance videos. | Identification testimony constitutes plain error. | No plain error; evidence of guilt overwhelming; argument overruled. |
| Admission of Malloy’s out-of-court statements | Malloy’s statements were admissible as substantive evidence. | Admission constituted plain error. | Dismissed for lack of plain-error showing and preservation. |
| Whitted’s absence from habitual felon phase | Court improperly handled presence/absence during habitual felon phase. | Whitted voluntarily waived presence when asked to return. | Waiver valid; no §15A-1032 violation; absence did not require instruction. |
| Oral waiver of right to be present | Waiver by counsel should be permitted under statute. | Statutory requirements for waiver not satisfied. | Waiver valid; statute inapplicable to non-plea trial waivers; no error. |
| Presumptive range sentencing in equipoise | Court could not impose presumptive range where aggravating and mitigating factors are in equipoise. | Court erred in not recognizing discretion to depart or apply presumptive range. | Overruled; trial court’s discretion properly recognized; no error. |
| Substantive due process by court constraints (tasers, shackles, etc.) | Criminal procedure violated due process. | Issue preserved for appeal. | Not preserved for review; dismissed. |
| Effectiveness of counsel | Counsel failed to object or preserve several issues. | Counsel deficient performance affected outcome. | Remand for competency proceedings; otherwise, no reversible impact on outcomes; issues not reversible. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Badgett, 361 N.C. 234, 644 S.E.2d 206 (2007) (competency standard and sua sponte duty to address incompetence)
- State v. Staten, 172 N.C.App. 673, 616 S.E.2d 650 (2005) (duty to address bona fide doubt of competency)
- State v. McRae, 139 N.C.App. 387, 533 S.E.2d 557 (2000) (temporal changes in competency; retrospective evaluation framework)
- State v. Richardson, 330 N.C. 174, 410 S.E.2d 61 (1991) (confrontation right waivable; examples of waiver of presence)
- State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 324 S.E.2d 241 (1985) (confrontation right waivable in noncapital felony trials)
