State v. White, 215 Conn.App. 273

On July 24, 2017, Keemo White got into a hallway altercation; a gun fell from his pocket during the scuffle.
White ran to a nearby parking lot, conferred with an acquaintance who was armed, and the two ran toward Michael (Gordon) who and two others had entered Gordon’s car.
White and the acquaintance forced the driver’s door, Gordon tried to flee, and the acquaintance shot Gordon; White was charged as an accessory to first‑degree assault by means of the discharge of a firearm.
At trial witnesses (Gordon and Anna) and surveillance video showed White and the other man pulling on the car door while the other man held a gun; White was convicted as an accessory and sentenced.
On appeal White argued (1) the evidence was insufficient to prove he intended to cause physical injury or intended/knowed the principal would use a firearm, and (2) the court should have instructed the jury that an accessory must intend or know that a firearm would be discharged.
The trial court had declined White’s requested instruction, relying on Connecticut precedent (e.g., Gonzalez, Artis) that an accessory need not intend or know a co‑actor would use a weapon when the aggravating means requires only general intent.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence that White intended to cause physical injury (accessory liability)	State: cumulative evidence—White enlisted the armed acquaintance, ran to confront victims, pulled on car door with the other man, continued despite pleas; video corroborated testimony—supports inference of intent to cause injury.	White: actions were ambiguous and brief; no proof he intended to harm or intended/know the principal would use a gun; inferences of intent are speculative.	Affirmed. The jury reasonably could infer White intended to cause physical injury from his conduct; evidence was sufficient.
Whether jury should be instructed that an accessory must intend or know the principal would discharge a firearm	State: statute and controlling Connecticut precedents require only intent to cause physical injury; means (discharge of firearm) is an aggravating means that carries no specific‑intent element, so no instruction required.	White: urges application of Pond (conspiracy requires specific intent as to every element) or at least a Rosemond‑type knowledge requirement; argues omission deprived him of an essential element.	Affirmed. Court held neither intent nor knowledge that a firearm would be discharged is an element of accessory liability under Conn. Gen. Stat. §§53a‑8 and 53a‑59(a)(5); followed Gonzalez/Artis and declined to extend Pond or adopt Rosemond.

State v. Pond, 315 Conn. 451 (Conn. 2015) (conspiracy requires specific intent that every element of planned offense be accomplished)
State v. Gonzalez, 300 Conn. 490 (Conn. 2011) (accessory need not intend or know that principal will use a firearm when the firearm element requires no particular mental state)
State v. Artis, 136 Conn. App. 568 (Conn. App. 2012) (for accessory to assault with a dangerous instrument, defendant need only intend serious physical injury, not the specific means)
State v. McCalpine, 190 Conn. 822 (Conn. 1983) (accessory statute does not require knowledge or endorsement of every coparticipant act)
Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (U.S. 2014) (federal aiding‑and‑abetting interpretation requires knowledge of a confederate’s gun under 18 U.S.C. §924(c))
State v. Bennett, 307 Conn. 758 (Conn. 2013) (insufficient evidence where little showed defendant’s actions or intent prior to shooting)
State v. Raynor, 175 Conn. App. 409 (Conn. App. 2017) (elements and standards for accessory liability to assault in the first degree)