State v. White, 42 A.3d 783

Defendant Roscoe White was suspected in the January 2, 2007 Kar shooting in Manchester, NH.
Over the following year, police continued their investigation, including undercover drug purchases from White (Oct–Nov 2007).
An informant in Hillsborough County Jail offered information about the shooting in exchange for leniency on pending charges.
Police arranged for an in-cell meeting between the informant and White to obtain information about the murder, with explicit instructions not to discuss drug charges.
On Feb. 11, 2008, authorities obtained a one-party interception authorization for a recording, later admitted as limited to homicide; the informant and White then spoke in a cell, and the informant did discuss drug charges despite instructions.
White moved to suppress the statements, arguing violation of his right to counsel on drug charges and that any later statements (about the shooting) were fruit of that violation and due process liability; the trial court denied the motion, ruling the right to counsel attached for drug charges but not for the shooting charges, and that the shooting statements were admissible.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did the informant’s questioning violate White’s right to counsel on the drug charges?	White argues Sixth Amendment and NH Const. Article 15 rights were violated.	State contends the right to counsel attached only on drug charges; shooting charge right to counsel had not attached.	Yes, violated on drug charges; but no Sixth Amendment/applicable right attached for shooting.
Are uncharged-offense statements tainted by a right-to-counsel violation on charged offenses admissible?	White seeks fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree suppression.	Admissibility limited to uncharged offenses if only charged-offense rights violated.	No automatic fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree suppression for shooting statements; offense-specific rule applies.
Is the right to counsel offense-specific under the NH and US constitutions as applied here?	Rights attach to charged offenses only; taint may affect other charges.	Right to counsel is offense-specific; uncharged offenses may be admissible.	Adopted offense-specific approach; statements about shooting admissible since not charged at that time.
Does due process require suppression to avoid state actors’ deliberate rights-violating conduct?	State actions could shock the conscience and violate due process.	Informant conduct, while improper, does not rise to due process violation under these facts.	No due process violation; actions not fundamentally unfair under NH and federal standards.

McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991) (right to counsel attaches at trial under offense-specific rule)
Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985) (taint from counsel violation tailored relief; uncharged offenses can be admissible at those trials)
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (limits on using evidence to pursue pending charges when Sixth Amendment rights violated)
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980) (informant interrogations in jail raise Sixth Amendment concerns)
State v. Bruneau, 131 N.H. 104 (1988) ( Sixth Amendment/interrogation in jailhouse context in NH)