State v. Weyand, 399 P.3d 530

Background

At 2:40 a.m. on Dec. 22, 2012, Officer Henry observed a car parked near 95 Cullum (a residence with an extensive police history of drug contacts) and then saw Wesley Weyand and another man leave the house, walk briskly while glancing up and down the street, and enter the car (Weyand as passenger).
Henry ran the car plate (no results), stopped the vehicle based on the house's drug history and the men's conduct, and during the encounter observed signs he believed indicated narcotics use (red/glassy eyes, constricted pupils).
A name check revealed an outstanding warrant; after arresting Weyand and searching incident to arrest, Henry found a capped syringe containing heroin; Weyand made post-Miranda admissions about buying heroin at 95 Cullum.
Weyand was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance and moved to suppress evidence from the stop, arguing the officer lacked individualized reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop.
The trial court denied suppression and convicted Weyand; the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Washington Supreme Court granted review and reversed, holding the stop was not supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Weyand)	Held
Whether officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop	House at 95 Cullum was a "known drug location," late-night short stay, brisk walking and furtive glances supplied individualized suspicion	Stopping someone for leaving a house with past drug contacts plus innocuous conduct (walking briskly, looking around) is insufficient	No — stop was not justified; facts did not provide individualized reasonable suspicion
Whether evidence seized after arrest should be suppressed as fruit of unlawful stop	Evidence admissible because officer had reasonable suspicion and arrest/warrant legitimized search incident to arrest	Evidence should be suppressed because the initial seizure was unlawful; later discoveries tainted by illegal stop	Suppressible — initial stop unlawful, so evidence from that intrusion should have been excluded
Whether officer’s training/experience and location justify deference to officer’s suspicion	Officer’s experience and totality (time, location, house history) created reasonable inference of ongoing drug activity	Training/experience cannot substitute for particularized facts linking Weyand to criminal activity at inception of stop	Training/experience insufficient absent individualized, articulable facts
Whether furtive movements/being in a high-crime location alone can justify Terry stop	Brisk walking and street-glancing in front of a known drug house are furtive and, with house’s history, support suspicion	Furtive movements and presence near a high-crime or drug-house are often innocuous and too vague to justify seizure	Court rejected furtive-movement/high-crime-area alone as sufficient; must be particularized to the person

Key Cases Cited

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishes investigatory stop standard: reasonable, articulable suspicion)
State v. Fuentes, 183 Wn.2d 149 (2015) (examines when short visits to a suspected drug location can support a Terry stop)
State v. Sandoz, 183 Wn.2d 149 (2015) (consolidated with Fuentes; analyzed limits of inferences from visits to known drug locations)
State v. Doughty, 170 Wn.2d 57 (2010) (refused to find reasonable suspicion from visit to known drug location absent furtive or particularized facts)
State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1 (1986) (discusses informant tips and individualized suspicion requirements)
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) (totality-of-circumstances test and role of officer experience in assessing reasonable suspicion)
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (quoted for objective standard of reasonable belief)
State v. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d 242 (2009) (burden on State to justify warrantless seizure; standards of review for suppression rulings)