383 P.3d 875
Or. Ct. App.2016Background
- Defendant was hired to perform carpentry at Goff's home; Goff gave him a key, turned off the alarm, and expressly permitted access while Goff and his wife were away for about a week.
- Goff allowed defendant to use the first-floor refrigerator, bathroom, and telephone and to be on the premises to finish specified work.
- When Goff returned he discovered multiple items missing (coins, alcohol, frozen meat, a spotting scope, three shotguns); defendant later admitted taking them.
- Defendant conceded theft at trial but moved for judgment of acquittal on the burglary charge, arguing his initial entry and presence were with Goff’s permission and never unlawfully remained.
- The state’s theory was that defendant became a trespasser (and thus a burglar) by committing theft while lawfully on the premises, without asserting any temporal or spatial exceedance of Goff’s consent.
- The trial court denied the motion; a jury convicted defendant of theft and first-degree burglary. On appeal the court evaluated whether the state presented legally sufficient evidence that defendant entered or remained unlawfully.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether committing an unauthorized crime while lawfully on private premises converts lawful entry into "entering or remaining unlawfully" for burglary | Theft inside the house exceeded the scope of the contractor's license; commission of the crime made him a trespasser and thus a burglar | Permission to be on premises is not negated merely because the licensee commits a crime; burglary requires unlawful entry/remain separate from the subsequent crime | Court reversed burglary conviction: commission of the crime alone does not convert lawful entry into unlawful remaining; state failed to prove trespass element |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Felt, 108 Or. App. 730 (1991) (upheld burglary where evidence supported victim implicitly revoking permission)
- State v. Hartfield, 290 Or. 583 (1981) (criminal trespass is the requisite primary element of burglary)
- State v. Pitts, 259 Or. App. 372 (2013) (burglary complete when trespass coincides with intent to commit crime)
- People v. Crowell, 470 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1983) (contractor given key not guilty of burglary for theft; criminal intent does not negate license)
- People v. Zee, 477 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1984) (rejecting rule that commission of crime automatically revokes license to remain)
- People v. Alvarez, 382 N.Y.S.2d 952 (1976) (authorization to enter not rendered inoperative by intent to steal)
- People v. Ennis, 322 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1971) (license to enter public building not extinguished by criminal intent)
- State v. Evans, 267 Or. App. 762 (2014) (denial of acquittal upheld where defendant exceeded spatial limits of permission by entering bedroom)
- State v. Holte, 170 Or. App. 377 (2000) (entering expressly excluded bedroom supports trespass element)
- State v. Hall, 327 Or. 568 (1998) (standard for reviewing denial of judgment of acquittal)
- State v. Gaines, 346 Or. 160 (2009) (statutory interpretation principles; examine text, context, legislative history)
- State v. Lucio-Camargo, 172 Or. App. 298 (2001) (legislative history: "remain unlawfully" intended to address public-buildings sit-in situations)
