496 P.3d 1183
Wash.2021Background
- Early morning, Weaver entered a house he believed belonged to friends, plugged in his phone, and later was awakened by police; he was charged with residential burglary based on alleged theft of electricity.
- Parties agreed to submit the lesser-included offense of first-degree criminal trespass to the jury (to-convict instruction required that defendant "knowingly entered or remained" and that he "knew that the entry or remaining was unlawful").
- The court also gave a pattern "knowledge" instruction stating it is not necessary that a person know the fact is "defined by law as being unlawful."
- Jury acquitted on burglary but convicted of first-degree criminal trespass; Weaver appealed, arguing the knowledge instruction conflicted with the trespass instruction and relieved the State of proving subjective knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt.
- The Supreme Court held the invited-error doctrine did not apply (State proposed the knowledge instruction) and, on the merits, found the instructions—read as a whole—clear and legally correct, affirming the conviction.
- Justice Gordon McCloud dissented, arguing the instructions were contradictory, relieved the State of proving an essential element, and that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Weaver) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the "knowledge" definitional instruction conflicted with the trespass to-convict instruction and relieved the State of proving subjective knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt | Instruction saying it is "not necessary" to know a fact is "defined by law as being unlawful" could be read to allow conviction without proof that Weaver knew his presence was unauthorized | The knowledge instruction simply states ignorance of the law is not a defense; read with the to-convict and unlawful-entry instructions, jurors must find Weaver knew he was not licensed, invited, or privileged to be there | Court rejected Weaver’s claim: instructions read as a whole required proof of awareness he lacked license/invitation and did not misstate law; conviction affirmed |
| Whether the invited-error doctrine bars review because the defense proposed the trespass instruction | Weaver argued the doctrine should not apply to the State-proposed knowledge instruction | State argued the defense proposed the lesser-included trespass instruction and cannot complain | Court held invited-error doctrine inapplicable because Weaver did not propose the challenged knowledge instruction; review allowed |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. LeFaber, 128 Wn.2d 896 (Wash. 1996) (instructions must be "manifestly clear" to the average juror)
- State v. O'Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91 (Wash. 2009) (instructions read as a whole must correctly state the law and permit presentation of defendant's theory)
- State v. Emery, 174 Wn.2d 741 (Wash. 2012) (jurors are presumed to follow the court's instructions)
- State v. Brown, 147 Wn.2d 330 (Wash. 2002) (harmless-error standard for constitutional error in jury instructions and element omission)
- Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1999) (harmless-error framework when an element is omitted or misstated)
- Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (U.S. 1979) (ambiguity in instructions may undermine assurance that jury followed constitutional interpretation)