State v. Watkins, 218 N.C. App. 94

Watkins was convicted by jury of first-degree burglary, conspiracy to commit first-degree burglary, possession of a weapon of mass destruction, common law robbery, and first-degree kidnapping after an incident on 9 May 2009 at 634 Lex Drive, Charlotte.
Home invasion involved breaking a window with a shotgun, the occupants noticing movement inside, and the defendants fleeing; a gun and BB gun were recovered from the scene.
Smith was hijacked at gunpoint in his car on campus; he identified Watkins at the scene and in court.
A shotgun and BB gun were linked to the defendant through statements to detectives and physical evidence.
The trial court entered judgments and sentenced Watkins; on appeal, Watkins challenges sufficiency of the evidence, identification, and restitution, while the State cross-challenges none of these.
The Court vacates the first-degree burglary conviction and remands for judgment on felonious breaking or entering, and affirms the other challenged rulings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of entry for first-degree burglary	State argued entry occurred via instrument crossing threshold	Watkins contends no entry by person or instrument crossing threshold	Evidence supports felonious breaking or entering; first-degree burglary vacated
Sufficiency of taking in common law robbery	State showed taking of Smith's car by force with a gun	Watkins argues no taking or control	Sufficient evidence of taking; robbery upheld
Plain error in identifications (out-of-court and in-court)	Identification procedures were lawful; not plain error	Show-up was unnecessarily suggestive	No plain error; identifications admissible
Restitution amount supported by evidence	Prosecutor provided title and purchase records showing car value	Insufficient evidence of amount and payee	Restitution supported by competent evidence; affirmed
Judgment on burglary vs. felonious breaking or entering	Jury verdict supported burglary	Evidence only supports breaking/entering	Vacate burglary judgment; remand for felonious breaking or entering judgment

State v. Sneed, 38 N.C.App. 230 (1978) (definition of entry in burglary cases; instrument can constitute entry when used to commit felony)
State v. Gibbs, 297 N.C.410 (1979) (entry may be by instrument crossing threshold; body entry not always required)
State v. Turnage, 362 N.C. 491 (2008) (entry defined; reaffirmed broad meaning of entry)
State v. Harris, 308 N.C. 159 (1983) (pretrial identifications; substantial likelihood of misidentification standard)
State v. Fisher, 321 N.C. 19 (1987) (two-step test for due process in identification procedures)
State v. Pulley, 180 N.C.App. 54 (2006) (factors for evaluating reliability of identifications; totality of circumstances)
State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373 (2000) (standard for denial of motion to dismiss; substantial evidence)