State v. Waters, 87 A.3d 512

Waters was subject to a 2009 relief-from-abuse (RFA) order prohibiting abuse, threats, stalking, or harassing contact, with telephone contact allowed but no frequency limits.
The December 2009 modifications did not restrict text messaging or define harassment; the order primarily barred harassment and direct contact beyond telephone, including with the child via telephone only on Fridays.
The State charged Waters with violating the RFA order for harassment after complainant reported about 40 texts and 30+ calls in a month, claiming she felt harassed.
Trial court instructed jurors on harassment as conduct likely to annoy, irritate, torment, or alarm a person, without a defined statutory meaning, and no objection was made.
Waters was convicted; on appeal the Vermont Supreme Court held the harassment instruction was plain error because it could convict for conduct that did not meet a legally proper definition of harassment under the RFA.
The court reversed Waters’ conviction and remanded for entry of judgment of acquittal, and discussed potential need for clearer, more specific limits on 'harassment' in RFA orders.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the harassment instruction was plain error	Waters argues the instruction was overly broad and allowed conviction for non-threatening conduct.	Waters contends the instruction misdefined harassment and violated due process.	Yes; instruction was plain error and unsupported by the evidence.
Whether the RFA order provided adequate notice of violation	Waters contends lack of explicit harassment definition in the order failed due process notice.	Waters argues the form order’s language suffices to prohibit harassment under the circumstances.	No adequate notice under plain-error standard; lack of precise harassment definition risks ambiguity.
What should define harassment in an RFA context lacking explicit definition	Goyette suggests harassment can be broader; the majority defers to a stalking-definitional approach.	Waters argues harassment should be understood by ordinary language, not imported stalking definitions; the form order suffices.	Harassment defined using a stalking-statute-like standard is appropriate; the trial court’s broader definition was erroneous.

Benson v. Muscari, 172 Vt. 1, 769 A.2d 1291 (2001) (RFA orders may prohibit conduct to prevent future abuse)
State v. Goyette, 166 Vt. 299, 691 A.2d 1064 (1997) (overbreadth caution in harassment definition; context matters)
State v. Sanville, 2011 VT 34, 189 Vt. 626, 22 A.3d 450 (2011) (due-process notice in probation-like orders)
State v. Danaher, 174 Vt. 591, 819 A.2d 691 (2002) (probation-like notices and conduct definitions)
State v. Frechette, 161 Vt. 233, 637 A.2d 1080 (1993) (due-process and definitional clarity in criminal statutes)
State v. Hinchliffe, 2009 VT 111, 186 Vt. 487, 987 A.2d 988 (2009) (context of past events affects reasonable-fear analysis)
State v. Rounds, 2011 VT 39, 189 Vt. 447, 22 A.3d 477 (2011) (plain-error review of jury instructions in VT)
Crown, 169 Vt. 547, 726 A.2d 493 (1999) (probation-RFA context; notice requirement)