State v. Wallace, 1004000821

Wallace, on Level II probation with a No Contact Order regarding Johanna Garcia, was subject to a home-visit compliance check on April 1, 2010 that led officers to enter the residence and seize drugs, paraphernalia, firearms, and cash. Wallace was arrested and charged for new drug offenses and for violating probation.
Officer testimony and a safety sweep produced evidence; the central factual dispute was whether 14-year-old Devonte Garcia consented to entry.
Wallace moved to suppress; while that motion was pending the State made plea offers (recommendations of 8 and then 7 years). Wallace rejected both offers, proceeded to a stipulated bench trial, and was convicted of Trafficking, PWID, and Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony (PFBPP). He received 16 years at Level V for the new offenses, plus 2 years for the VOP.
Wallace appealed; the Supreme Court remanded for the Superior Court to decide whether there was consent and whether Procedure 7.3 was constitutional; those issues were resolved for the State and the conviction was affirmed.
Wallace filed a timely Rule 61 motion asserting ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC): (1) counsel’s advice about rejecting plea offers was deficient and prejudicial; (2) counsel failed to seek merger of Trafficking and PWID sentences. The Superior Court denied relief.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Wallace)	Defendant's Argument (State/Trial Counsel)	Held
Whether Trial Counsel rendered IAC by advising Wallace to reject plea offers	Counsel gave objectively deficient advice and materially contributed to Wallace rejecting offers that would have produced a lesser sentence	Counsel informed Wallace of offers, risks (including possible life as habitual), expressed qualified optimism about suppression, and Wallace was adamant about fighting the case	Court held counsel’s advice was not objectively unreasonable and Wallace failed to show prejudice under Lafler/Frye/Hill standards; IAC claim denied
Whether Trial Counsel rendered IAC by not seeking merger of Trafficking and PWID for sentencing	Counsel should have moved to merge the sentences because both arose from the same conduct	At sentencing the law and controlling precedent (Skyers) permitted separate sentences; merger request would have been contrary to settled law	Court held counsel’s failure to seek merger was not objectively unreasonable; IAC claim denied

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (Ineffective assistance two‑prong test)
Hill v. Lockhart, 472 U.S. 52 (Strickland applied to guilty-plea contexts)
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (counsel’s duty to communicate plea offers)
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (prejudice test where ineffective advice leads to rejected plea)
Burns v. State, 76 A.3d 780 (Del. standard applying Lafler; qualified optimism about suppression not unreasonable)
Wallace v. State, 31 A.3d 77 (Del. 2011) (related direct-appeal decision)
Wallace v. State, 62 A.3d 1192 (Del. 2012) (remand decision addressing consent and Procedure 7.3)
State v. Skyers, 560 A.2d 1052 (Del. 1989) (permitting separate sentences for trafficking and possession-related statutes)
Melton v. State, 74 A.3d 654 (Del. 2013) (post-reform decision upholding separate pre-reform sentences)
Fountain v. State, 139 A.3d 837 (Del. 2016) (statutory amendment on concurrency held non-retroactive)