State v. Walker, 304 Kan. 441

Background

Victim Janis Sanders was found naked with ligature neck wounds; shoelace and knife at scene; torn, bloodstained clothing and personal effects were found in a dumpster. DNA from under the victim's fingernails, the shoelace, and the knife handle did not exclude Walker.
Witness Charles Williams and passenger Suzana Hernandez placed Walker at the scene; inmate Thomas Wilson testified Walker described strangling Sanders with a shoelace to avoid blood and fingerprints.
Walker had a prior conviction for a strangulation homicide (pled to second-degree murder of Tamara Baker); the prior was admitted at trial to show similarity.
At trial Walker was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder; with his agreement, the jury was instructed only on first-degree murder (no lesser included instruction requested).
Walker moved to suppress statements from a custodial interrogation; the district court denied suppression. On appeal the Kansas Supreme Court found Walker unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent during the interview and that later statements were admitted in error but that error was harmless.
The court affirmed conviction and the imposition of a hard-50 sentence based solely on Walker’s stipulated prior second-degree murder conviction, finding no Alleyne violation as to the fact of a prior conviction.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Failure to give lesser included instruction (2nd-degree murder)	State: instruction unnecessary given evidence of premeditation	Walker: omission was clear error and prejudicial	Court: even assuming instruction appropriate, error harmless — overwhelming evidence of premeditation; no clear error shown
Prosecutorial misconduct in closing ("left like trash")	State: rebuttal to defense victim-blame; within wide latitude	Walker: comment was inflammatory and repugnant, inflamed jury	Court: remark responded to defense attack and was tied to evidence; not improper
Suppression: invocation of right to remain silent and voluntariness of statements	State: interview was custodial but voluntary; invocations were ambiguous except third which was clear; post-invocation statements admissible	Walker: he unequivocally invoked his Miranda right and was impaired by alcohol/sleep; statements involuntary	Court: voluntariness finding supported; but third invocation was unambiguous — post-invocation statements should have been suppressed; admission harmless because same facts were admitted otherwise
Hard-50 sentence under Alleyne	State: prior-conviction exception (Almendarez-Torres) allows judge to rely on prior conviction to impose hard-50	Walker: aggravator requires additional factual finding (prior involved great bodily harm/death) and so jury must find it beyond reasonable doubt under Alleyne	Court: prior conviction for second-degree murder necessarily involves death — Almendarez-Torres exception applies; sentence constitutional

Key Cases Cited

State v. Soto, 301 Kan. 969 (lesser-included instruction review and "clearly erroneous" standard)
State v. Aguirre, 301 Kan. 950 (Miranda invocation must be scrupulously honored; clarity test)
State v. Cooper, 303 Kan. 764 (application of clear-error standard for omitted lesser instruction)
State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697 (improper, repugnant prosecutorial imagery)
State v. Gilliland, 294 Kan. 519 (intoxication does not per se render confession involuntary; totality of circumstances)
State v. Astorga, 299 Kan. 395 (hard-50 sentencing scheme and Alleyne analysis)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda rights principle)
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (post-invocation admissibility depends on whether right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored)
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (invocation must be unambiguous; objective test)
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (postrequest answers cannot be used to retrospectively cloud clarity of invocation)
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (narrow exception: fact of prior conviction need not be found by jury)
Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (fact increasing mandatory minimum must be found by jury; discussed in sentencing context)