State v. Wagner, 510 P.3d 1083

In 1994, 16-year-old Charles Vincent Wagner Jr. shot and killed a woman; he was tried as an adult, convicted of first-degree murder and attempted armed robbery, and sentenced to “natural life” (no release) plus a consecutive term.
Parole had been abolished for crimes committed after Jan. 1, 1994, so the sentencing scheme left either death, natural life without release, or life with release only via executive clemency after 25 years.
The trial court found two statutory aggravators (pecuniary gain and cruelty) and mitigation (including age) and imposed natural life without release; convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.
After Miller v. Alabama and Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Valencia held Miller/Montgomery applied retroactively and entitled similarly situated juveniles sentenced to natural life to an evidentiary hearing to show transient immaturity.
The superior court initially agreed Wagner was entitled to a Valencia hearing, but after Jones v. Mississippi the State moved to vacate; the superior court dismissed Wagner’s Rule 32.1(g) petition, ruling Jones implicitly overruled Valencia and Miller did not apply because the sentence was discretionary and the judge had considered Wagner’s youth.
The Court of Appeals reverses: Jones did not overrule Valencia; Miller/Montgomery apply to Wagner’s non-parole-eligible life term; remand for an evidentiary hearing under Valencia.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Jones implicitly overruled State v. Valencia	Wagner: Jones did not overrule Valencia; Valencia remains binding	State: Jones implicitly overruled Valencia, eliminating Valencia relief	Court: Jones did not overrule Valencia; superior court erred in concluding otherwise
Whether Miller/Montgomery apply where parole was abolished and only clemency release exists	Wagner: Miller applies because no parole-eligible sentence was available; his sentence was functionally LWOP	State: Miller doesn't apply because sentence was discretionary and judge considered youth	Court: Miller/Montgomery apply; Valencia correctly encompassed such sentences
Whether prior consideration of youth at original sentencing satisfies Miller post-Jones	Wagner: Even if youth was considered, Valencia requires an evidentiary hearing to show transient immaturity	State: Consideration at sentencing satisfied Miller as interpreted in Jones	Court: Consideration alone is insufficient; remand for Valencia hearing to allow proof by preponderance
Whether executive clemency equals parole for Miller purposes	Wagner: Clemency is not equivalent to parole; it does not provide meaningful release opportunity	State: Release via clemency suffices to make sentence parole-eligible	Court: Clemency is not equivalent to parole; scheme falls within Miller’s reach

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles unconstitutional; sentencer must consider youth)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) (Miller is retroactive; requires consideration of youth and an opportunity to show transient immaturity)
State v. Valencia, 241 Ariz. 206 (2016) (Arizona Supreme Court applied Miller/Montgomery retroactively and required evidentiary hearings for juveniles sentenced to natural life)
Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021) (clarified Miller does not require an explicit finding of permanent incorrigibility)
Tatum v. Arizona, 137 S. Ct. 11 (2016) (Supreme Court GVR’d Arizona cases for reconsideration in light of Montgomery)
Chaparro v. Shinn, 248 Ariz. 138 (2020) (held executive clemency is not equivalent to parole)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (recognized clemency is not a substitute for parole in providing a meaningful release opportunity)