State v. Waggoner, 297 Kan. 94

Waggoner was convicted by a jury of aggravated indecent liberties with a child under 14, a Jessica’s Law case warranting life with a 25-year minimum.
From the bench, the court ordered lifelong parole with lifelong electronic monitoring; the sentencing journal entry, however, stated lifetime postrelease supervision and lifetime electronic monitoring.
On appeal, Waggoner challenged (i) the jury instruction on alternative means lacking a unanimity instruction, and (ii) a burden-of-proof instruction that allegedly violated the right to have guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
The State’s responses and Kansas case law were cited to address unanimity and reasonable-doubt instruction issues, with prior decisions rejecting similar challenges.
The court affirmed the conviction on these issues but identified sentencing defects in the journal entry and the electronic monitoring imposition.
Because the bench pronouncement and the journal entry diverged, and because lifetime electronic monitoring was improperly imposed as a sentencing condition, the case was remanded for correction of the journal entry and vacated the electronic monitoring component.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was the alternative means instruction error-free without unanimity?	Waggoner argues the instruction misstated elements by implying dual-intent premises.	State contends the phrase 'either the child or the offender, or both' describes a means, not a separate element, and required unanimity on the mental state only.	No reversible error; instruction legally appropriate.
Did Instruction No. 2 (reasonable doubt) violate the beyond-reasonable-doubt standard?	Waggoner asserts the 'any' vs. 'each' phrasing diluted the State’s burden and violated rights.	State asserts pre-2005 language remains legally valid and non-structural error given no objection at trial.	Not erroneous; instruction upheld.
Were sentencing journal entry and electronic monitoring correctly imposed?	Waggoner contends the journal entry wrongly reflected postrelease supervision instead of parole and that lifetime electronic monitoring was improper.	State concedes journal entry error on postrelease supervision; electronic monitoring by bench is improper as a parole condition.	Remanded to correct journal entry for parole status; lifetime electronic monitoring vacated.

State v. Brown, 295 Kan. 181 (2012) (interprets 'either the child or the offender, or both' as non-elemental, within a means)
State v. Britt, 295 Kan. 1018 (2012) (aggravated indecent liberties; clarifies mental-state elements)
State v. Burns, 295 Kan. 951 (2012) (same topic on means and mental state)
State v. Beck, 32 Kan. App. 2d 784 (2004) (any/any vs. any/each language discussion of pattern instructions)
State v. Summers, 293 Kan. 819 (2012) (off-grid indeterminate life sentence and parole authority)
State v. McKnight, 292 Kan. 776 (2011) (journal-entry corrections and effective sentence date)
State v. Antrim, 294 Kan. 632 (2012) (journal-entry corrections and sentencing procedures)
State v. Jolly, 291 Kan. 842 (2011) (parole vs. electronic monitoring considerations)
State v. Mason, 294 Kan. 675 (2012) (electronic monitoring authority and limitations)
State v. Beaman, 295 Kan. 853 (2012) (parole/electronic-monitoring framework in sentencing)