State v. Wade, 421 S.W.3d 429

Background

Three consolidated appeals (Wade, Peterson, Carey) challenge § 566.150 — a statute criminalizing presence/loitering within 500 feet of parks/playgrounds or public swimming pools by persons previously convicted of specified sexual offenses.
Wade pleaded guilty to sex offenses in 1996 and was later prosecuted under § 566.150 for being within 500 feet of a park; he was convicted after a bench trial and appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss.
Peterson (convicted in Louisiana in 1998) and Carey (pleaded guilty in 1997) were indicted/charged under § 566.150 for conduct occurring after the statute’s enactment and moved to dismiss on the ground the statute is unconstitutionally "retrospective in its operation" under Mo. Const. art. I, § 13.
The trial courts dismissed charges as to Peterson and Carey, finding § 566.150 retrospective as applied; the State appealed. The State argued article I, § 13’s retrospective clause applies only to civil laws, not criminal laws.
The Missouri Supreme Court framed the decisive legal question as whether § 566.150 is a criminal law (subject to ex post facto analysis) or a civil/regulatory law (subject to the retrospective prohibition). The Court reviewed statutory text, placement, elements, penalties, and purpose under the two-step Smith/Honeycutt test.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether article I, § 13's ban on laws "retrospective in their operation" applies to criminal statutes	(Peterson/Carey) § 566.150 is retrospective and therefore unconstitutional as applied to persons convicted before enactment	(State/Wade) The retrospective clause applies only to civil laws; criminal laws are governed by ex post facto clause	The Court reaffirmed that Missouri’s retrospective clause does not apply to criminal laws (following State v. Honeycutt).
Whether § 566.150 is criminal or civil in nature	(Peterson/Carey) The statute is regulatory/civil (part of sex-offender regulatory scheme) and thus retrospective analysis applies	(State/Wade) § 566.150 is codified in criminal code, uses criminal mens rea and felony penalties; it punishes future conduct	The Court held § 566.150 is a criminal statute under the two-step test (legislative intent + punitive-effects factors).
Whether dismissal was proper for Peterson and Carey based on retrospective clause	§ 566.150 imposed a new obligation retroactively; convictions should be dismissed	State argued retrospective clause inapplicable to criminal laws; trial courts erred	The Court reversed dismissals as to Peterson and Carey and remanded.
Whether Wade’s conviction should have been dismissed on retrospective grounds	Wade argued unconstitutionally retrospective application	State argued criminal statute; retrospective clause inapplicable	The Court affirmed Wade’s conviction; trial court correctly denied dismissal.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Honeycutt, 421 S.W.3d 410 (Mo. banc 2013) (reaffirmed that Missouri’s “retrospective” clause applies to civil laws and set out the two-step test to classify statutes as civil or criminal)
Ex parte Bethurum, 66 Mo. 545 (Mo. 1877) (early Missouri precedent distinguishing ex post facto and retrospective clauses; retrospective clause applied to civil laws)
R.L. v. Dep’t of Corrections, 245 S.W.3d 236 (Mo. banc 2008) (invalidated residency restriction as retrospective in operation; treated the challenged law as civil/regulatory)
F.R. v. St. Charles Cnty. Sheriffs Dep’t, 301 S.W.3d 56 (Mo. banc 2010) (applied retrospective analysis to residency/Halloween restrictions on sex offenders)
R.W. v. Sanders, 168 S.W.3d 65 (Mo. banc 2005) (applied Smith factors to determine Missouri’s sex-offender registration scheme was civil)
Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833 (Mo. banc 2006) (addressed registration statutes and retrospective effect under Missouri Constitution)
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (U.S. 2003) (U.S. Supreme Court’s test for distinguishing punitive from civil/ regulatory sex-offender statutes)