State v. Villagomez, 412 P.3d 183

Background

Defendant stopped in traffic; police found ~142 grams methamphetamine divided into bags, >$4,000 cash, three cellphones, and a ledger; charged with unlawful possession (ORS 475.894) and unlawful delivery (ORS 475.890).
State proved delivery via Boyd-style constructive delivery (possession of large quantity with intent to sell); jury convicted on possession and delivery and found several Commercial Drug Offense (CDO) factors under ORS 475.900(1)(b).
State alleged four CDO factors including that the delivery “was for consideration,” possession of ≥ $300 cash, possession of drug records, and possession of ≥ 8 grams of methamphetamine; jury found three factors including “for consideration.”
Trial court denied defendant’s judgment of acquittal as to the “for consideration” factor; court sentenced defendant under the commercial drug offense scheme to prison (delivery and possession sentences).
Court of Appeals reversed as to the possession sentence, holding the evidence insufficient to prove the “for consideration” factor because the state failed to show a completed sale or an agreement to sell; affirmed on other points.
Oregon Supreme Court affirmed Court of Appeals: construed ORS 475.900(1)(b)(A) to require proof of either a completed sale or an existing agreement to sell to satisfy the “for consideration” factor; remanded for resentencing on possession conviction.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Villagomez's Argument	Held
Does ORS 475.900(1)(b)(A) (“delivery … and was for consideration”) require proof of a completed sale or agreement to sell, or is proof of intent to sell (Boyd delivery) sufficient?	“For” means “with the purpose of” — a defendant who constructively or attemptedly delivers with intent to obtain consideration meets the factor; Boyd delivery suffices.	"For consideration" requires the legal concept of consideration (bargained-for exchange); thus the state must show a completed sale or an existing agreement to sell.	Held for Villagomez: statute requires proof of a completed sale or an existing agreement to sell; Boyd-style intent-to-sell alone is insufficient.
Was the trial court’s denial of a judgment of acquittal on the "for consideration" factor harmless as to sentencing?	The jury also found a "substantial quantity" enhancement supporting enhanced sentence for delivery, making the Boyd-related error harmless for the delivery sentence.	Error in proving the CDO factor invalidates the commercial-drug enhancement for offenses not independently supported.	Court: Error was harmless for delivery sentence (substantial-quantity enhancement stands) but not for the possession sentence; remand for resentencing on possession.
What interpretive tools determine the meaning of "for consideration" in ORS 475.900(1)(b)(A)?	Emphasizes plain meaning of "for" and broad statutory definition of "delivery"; legislative awareness of Boyd supports broader reading.	Emphasizes legal term-of-art "consideration," statutory context of CDO factors as objective, additional indicia, and legislative history distinguishing sales from Boyd deliveries.	Court: Legislative history and statutory context favor Villagomez's contract/sale interpretation; "consideration" is a bargained-for concept requiring an agreement or completed sale.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Boyd, 92 Or. App. 51 (Court of Appeals) (permitting conviction for delivery based on possession of a large quantity with intent to sell)
State v. Moeller, 105 Or. App. 434 (Court of Appeals) (striking prior vague “scheme or network” sentencing provision)
State v. Gaines, 346 Or. 160 (methodology for determining legislative intent in statutory construction)
Shelley v. Portland Tug & Barge Co., 158 Or. 377 (definition of consideration in contract law)
Enco, Inc. v. F.C. Russell Co., 210 Or. 324 (consideration as bargained-for exchange)
Moro v. State of Oregon, 357 Or. 167 (discussion of consideration as necessary for a contract)
State v. Klein, 352 Or. 302 (contextual use of related statutes in interpretation)